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INTRODUCTION
Judicial conduct, particularly judicial misconduct, has long drawn public
attention and concern.' In the past few years, media coverage has brought the
Professor of Law, University of New Hampshire.
1. Peter W. Bowie, The Last ioo Years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX.
L. REV. 911, 911-12 (2007); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the
Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1914 (2010) (surveying the progress of judicial ethics from the early twen-
tieth century); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
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issue to the forefront, highlighting a reality that the legal profession might pre-
fer to avoid-that problematic judicial conduct frequently implicates lawyers.
Recent news stories have reported interactions between judges and lawyers that
are clearly prohibited by the codes of judicial conduct: They entail bribery,'
improper financial ties,' and even improper sexual relationships.4 Recent
reports have also covered problematic interactions between judges and lawyers
that are not proscribed and are, in fact, encouraged by the codes of judicial con-
duct'-codes that prohibit similar ties between judges and other private
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 729 (1906) ("Dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice is as old as law.").
2. See, e.g., Robert Gavin, Attorneys Voice Support for Spargo: Character Letters Re-
ceived as Sentencing of Ex-State Supreme Court Jurist Nears, ALBANY TIMES UNION,
Dec. 19, 2009, at Ai (reporting the bribery and extortion of several lawyers in
Albany, New York); Mitchell Landsberg, Judge Accused of Bribery Attempt, L.A.
TIMES, July 1o, 2009, at A8 (reporting the bribery of a deputy district attorney);
Joel Stashenko, Ex-N.Y. Judge Sentenced to 27 Months for Attempted Bribery, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23, 2009, at 4 (reporting a judge's attempted extortion and
bribery of lawyers).
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania: Ex-Judge Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, at A14 (re-
porting on the guilty plea of a former Luzerne County judge accused of receiving
kickbacks for convicting and sentencing youth to terms at for-profit detention
centers run by lawyers).
4. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Courtly Love: Why an Affair Fails the 'Ick' Test, NEWS-
WEEK, May 3, 2010, at 21 (reporting on the death sentence of Charles Dean Hood,
who was convicted of murder in a trial in which the trial judge and prosecutor
were having an affair). For additional reports of judicial misconduct scandals im-
plicating lawyers, see Nancy Swan, News About Judicial Misconduct, Corruption,
Accountability, NANCY SWAN, http://www.nancyswan.com/interests/judicial
-reform/news (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). For a comprehensive catalog of types and
examples of judicial misconduct, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L.
REV. 431, 432-56 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Karen Heller, Chief Justice Castille Should Forgo Gifts, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 28, 2010, at A2 (describing the thousands of dollars in gifts, rounds of golf,
and travel expenses received by a justice from law firms that regularly appeared
before him, which he justified as "ordinary social hospitality" permitted by the
codes); Christina Pazzanese, Opinion, OK for Judges To Attend Bar Events, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Jan. 27, 2011, available at http://masslawyersweekly.com/2o11/01/27/
opinion-ok-for-judges-to-party-at-bar-events ("In a surprise move that should
spice up guest lists around town, the Supreme Judicial Court has issued a Code of
Judicial Ethics opinion declaring that judges can attend bar association functions,
including educational conferences, receptions and even gala balls free from worry
that doing so will violate their ethical obligations."). A related issue, though not
the subject of this Article, is that the absence of a code of judicial ethics governing
United States Supreme Court Justices has allowed for recent conduct and beha-
viors that some perceive to be inappropriate. See Dahlia Lithwick, Running with
Gavels: Justices Need To Set Clearer Rules About Partisan Political Activity, SLATE




individuals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these codes of judicial conduct, adopted in
every state, are the product of a reform movement driven almost exclusively by
the legal profession.6
The bar's leading role in the twentieth-century reform of judicial conduct
regulation is one manifestation of the exceedingly close ties that bind our state
judiciaries and the legal profession. Close ties between bench and bar are gener-
ally accepted as desirable in a liberal democracy such as our own.7 However, as
social scientists Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley have
recently suggested, they are neither an unqualified good nor an end in them-
selves.' These scholars hypothesize that strong connections between a legal pro-
fession and judiciary may move "politics to or from a liberal form."9 Drawing
on case studies from a variety of nation-states,"o they explain that bench-bar
relationships occupy a continuum spanning from complete lack of engagement
6. There is no single legal profession, as the practice of law is subject to great
variation locally and by practice area. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN,
CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 3 (1982); David B.
Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1145, 1151 (1993). However, because of the remarkable unity with which bar
organizations have coalesced to address judicial conduct reform, and for ease of
reference, I refer throughout this Article to the profession as though it were of a
unitary nature.
7. See generally FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE
LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik
& Malcom Feeley eds., 2007) [hereinafter FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM]
(reviewing examples of bench-bar relationships in a variety of political systems).
8. See Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik & Malcolm Feeley, The Legal Complex in
Struggles for Political Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, Supra note
7, at 1, 7-8, 28-32.
9. Id. at 7-8.
10. Of the case studies cited, only one, Professor Halliday's study of the Chicago Bar
Association, is from a United States jurisdiction. See id. In his Illinois study, Pro-
fessor Halliday concluded that although close ties can promote an efficient and
fair justice system, they can also be exploited by the profession to assert increasing
control over the judiciary. TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS,
STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 216-17 (1987) ("[Tlhe bar has
succeeded in penetrating to every corner of its primary institution . . .. That is to
say, while the profession has tried to use its special knowledge and the experience
of practitioners to increase court efficiency, reduce inconsistency and contradic-
tions in rules, expedite the administration of justice, and order the entire system
of rules and aspects of court organization in general codes, its prescriptive and
policy functions have far exceeded the narrow limits that a strict constructionist
interpretation of expertise would place on it."); see also Halliday, Karpik & Feeley,
supra note 8, at 7-8 (citing the 1987 Halliday study for the proposition that rela-
tions between the bench and bar can be supportive but ambiguous in terms of
their effects on liberal democratic values).
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to complete engagement-from total disunity to total unity." They hypothesize
that if judiciaries and the profession are unified, their aligned interests confer
political efficacy. But this political efficacy may be used to harm" as well as to
promote 3 the core values of political liberalism.14 The work of these social
scientists raises important questions regarding the existing and ideal nature of
bench-bar relationships within our country's legal systems.
A small but significant literature addresses discrete aspects of these relation-
ships." Important work has addressed the role of the profession in judicial
selection and election systems.'" More recently, systematic doctrinal work has
addressed civil legal rules relating to, and arguably favoring, the legal
profession." This literature deepens our understanding of the close ties that
11. See Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 7-8.
12. See, e.g., Zithtti Arslan, Reluctantly Sailing Toward Political Liberalism: The Politi-
cal Role of the Judiciary in Turkey, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra
note 7, at 219, 222-28 (describing how the judiciary and the profession in Turkey
are largely conservative with reference to liberal democratic reform and generally
support rather than challenge state policies that impede political liberalism).
13. See, e.g., Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal
Complex in Pakistan Under Musharraf, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 985, 990 (2010)
(describing "how the relationship between the bar and the bench" in Pakistan
"move[d] from unengaged to oppositional to cooperative" in "producling] a mu-
tually reinforcing struggle for political liberalism"); Neta Ziv, Regulation of Israeli
Lawyers: From Professional Autonomy to Multi-Institutional Regulation, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1763, 1771-72 (2009) (describing how the Israeli bench and bar
established a close relationship as "a means to strengthen the independence of law
in a new liberal democracy").
14. Acknowledging the term "political liberalism" to be "notoriously ambiguous and
much contested," Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 1o, Halliday, Karpik,
and Feeley define it as entailing a moderate state, a strong and engaged civil socie-
ty, and basic legal freedoms inherent in civil citizenship, id. at io-11. These
elements, in turn, generally entail a strong and independent judiciary, which is
supportive of the rule of law. As used herein, the phrase "values of political libe-
ralism" refers to all of these systemic values.
15. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting
of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 393 (2001); Keith Swisher, Legal
Ethics and Campaign Contributions: The Professional Responsibility To Pay for Jus-
tice, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011); Margaret S. Williams & Corey A. Ditslear,
Bidding for Justice: The Influence of Attorneys' Contributions on State Supreme
Courts, 28 JUsT. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2007).
17. See, e.g., BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL SYSTEM (2011) [hereinafter BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS]; Benjamin H.
Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 453 (2oo8) [hereinafter Barton, Judges Systematically Favor]; Benjamin H.




characterize existing bench-bar relationships, but it stops short of addressing
the critical question raised by the work of Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley: How
can such relationships be shaped to promote rather than undermine the values
of political liberalism?
In this Article, I address this question by examining the legal profession's
leading role in the twentieth-century reform of state judicial conduct regulation
and the resulting codes of judicial conduct.'" I demonstrate that bar leaders
justified their influential role by reference to their civic interests and
quasi-governmental functions.'9 They portrayed their involvement as a natural
outgrowth of their duty to maintain, improve, and practice in an effective court
system.2 0 But in addition to pursuing these civic, public-oriented goals, the bar
also used the reform process to forward its powerful private interests as a
Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1185-86 (2003)
[hereinafter Barton, Institutional Analysis].
18. There has been little scholarship addressing judicial conduct in the states. As
noted, one exception is Halliday's 1987 sociological case study of the Chicago Bar
Association. Halliday devoted two chapters to discussing the ties between the As-
sociation and the Illinois judiciary, HALLIDAY, supra note lo, at chs. 6-7, including
reform efforts in the 1950s and 196os (prior to Illinois's adoption of the American
Bar Association's (ABA) Code of Judicial Ethics) to control judicial conduct out-
side of court. See id. at 181-89, 202-o8. A limited amount of work addresses con-
duct permitted by the codes generally, without specific discussion of the impact
on judge-lawyer relations. See Mark I. Harrison, The 2oo7 ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a Generation of Judges, 28 JusT. Sys. J. 257 (2007)
(describing the 2007 Code and the revision process); Irving R. Kaufman, Lions or
Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5
(1970) (discussing proposed revisions to the 1924 Canons and arguing that "we
should encourage rather than discourage judicial activities that exceed the four
corners of cases presented for disposition"); Robert McKay, The Judiciary and
Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (1970) (distinguishing be-
tween "quasi-judicial activities, which are likely to be tolerated or even encour-
aged, and extra-judicial activities, which are likely to be forbidden or at most tole-
rated"). Existing work also addresses the potential for private interest group
influence on the judiciary through privately sponsored educational trips and se-
minars. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational
Programs? Should Judicial Education Be Privatized?: Questions of Judicial Ethics and
Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 941, 942-43 (2002) (describing concerns that special
interests groups may try to lobby the federal judiciary through gifts of expense-
paid trips to private seminars); Douglas T. Kendall & Jason C. Rylander, Tainted
Justice: How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 18
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 65 (2004) (same).
19. See Lucien Karpik, Political Lawyers, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra
note 7, at 463, 463-65; see also Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies
and Performances, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 193, 223-26 (1997) (describing the
civic-oriented activities of bar associations).
20. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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fee-for-service occupation, which holds a monopoly over the practice of law.2'
Scholarly commentary has sometimes emphasized one or the other aspect of the
legal profession-its civic commitments" or its private interests23-but the two
21. As social scientists have long recognized, bar associations in the United States are
interested organizations-organizations that claim legitimacy by representing the
interests of their members. See, e.g., DONALD C. BLAISDELL, MONOGRAPH No. 26:
ECONOMIC POWER AND POLITICAL PRESSURES 37-40 (1941) (submitted to the U.S.
Temp. Nat'l Econ. Comm.); Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Representation: The Do-
minance of Institutions, 78 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 64 (1984); see also HALLIDAY, Supra
note io, at 369 ("[I]t is naive to suppose that professions will commit [their dis-
tinctive expertise] to the state irrespective of the interests of the profession-as it
were, to write a blank check for the state to cash in on professional expertise when
the state finds it expedient . . . .").
22. For example, sociological work in the functionalist tradition emphasized the
social value of professions in maintaining social order and promoting values such
as altruism. See KEITH M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 2-4
(1995); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING To BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 25-26 (2004). See generally
ALEXANDER M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS (1933) (es-
pousing that the professions are key institutions that promote social stability);
EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (1957) (emphasiz-
ing the role of the professions in preserving the moral authority of the state by
acting as intermediaries between individuals and the state); Talcott Parsons, The
Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 56 (Wil-
liam M. Evan ed., 1962) (emphasizing the orientation of the professions toward
collective well-being). More recently, legal scholars have drawn on this earlier
work to describe current failings of the legal profession and to frame its ideal
direction with reference to its lost past. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra, at 11-13.
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) (chro-
nicling a deepening crisis of values in the legal profession and a weakening com-
mitment to law as a public vocation); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (describing the ideal of the
"lawyer-statesman"-the lawyer who possessed the essential traits of prudence,
wisdom, and judgment).
23. See MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 4-12; SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 22, at
26-28. See generally TERRENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (1972) (em-
phasizing the market control that the professions hold over the production and
deployment of their trade); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIO-
NALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 208-44 (1979) (conceptualizing professionali-
zation as a process of achieving social control by gaining market monopoly over
knowledge and skills); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical
Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 654-58 (1981) (describing the legal profession's inter-





coexist in constant tension. 4 I argue that accounting for both is critical to
understanding and shaping desirable ties between the legal profession and state
judiciaries.
I begin in Part II by describing the process through which the bar success-
fully inserted itself into the judicial conduct reform movement of the twentieth
century. The American Bar Association (ABA) advanced the position that judi-
ciaries were part of the profession-an inversion of the traditional view that the
profession should serve strong independent judiciaries-in its ultimately suc-
cessful attempt to draft authoritative codes of judicial conduct. State and local
bar associations, working centrally through the ABA, then secured the codes'
adoption by the states. Several provisions of these codes granted lawyers and
legal organizations, including law firms, preferential access to members of state
judiciaries. Preferential access, in turn, facilitated informal and frequent
interactions between lawyers and judges and further tightened relationships
between bench and bar.
In Part III, I argue that the resulting integration of the two institutions
illustrates the risks that excessively close ties between state judiciaries and the
legal profession can pose to the values of political liberalism. Multiple benefits
can, and often do, flow from close and cooperative relationships. But both the
state judicial conduct reform process and the codes it produced altered and
tightened relationships in ways that jeopardize the independence and legitimacy
of both bench and bar.
In Part IV, I advocate for reforms that will minimize these risks by account-
ing for the dual civic and private orientations of the profession and by empo-
wering and encouraging strong and independent state judiciaries to engage with
a strong and independent legal profession. I propose a model of the bench-bar
relationship that is characterized by collaborative governance and guided by the
principles of broad-based stakeholder participation, problem-solving engage-
ment, and transparency. I conclude with specific suggestions for reforms to the
ABA model codes aimed at reshaping the contours of bench-bar relationships.
I. THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: JUDICIAL ACQUIESCENCE TO BAR
INFLUENCE
At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession and state judicia-
ries viewed themselves as distinct institutions, linked in hierarchical relation-
ships in which the profession occupied a subservient but independent role.
Through the process of judicial conduct regulation reform, the bar advanced a
new model of its relationship with the country's judiciaries, which characterized
judiciaries as a part of the legal profession. In this Part, I review the process
through which the bar, and the ABA in particular, used the new model to justify
24. See MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL PROFESSION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES 33 (20o6);
HALLIDAY, supra note io, at 369-70.
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its influential role in the reform movement and to become the authoritative
drafter of codes of judicial conduct. I then review the resulting codes,
which granted lawyers and legal organizations increasingly preferential access to
judges.
A. The Reform Process: Recasting Judiciaries as Part of the Profession
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the bar saw its reputation as
linked to that of the court system," but it did not yet view the country's judicia-
ries as subsidiary parts of the legal profession. To the contrary, it acquiesced in
the traditional view that the profession was a distinct and structurally subordi-
nate institution." Accordingly, when the ABA promulgated its first code of
attorney conduct in 1908 to bolster public confidence in the legal system,2 7 it
explicitly declined to draft an analogous code for judges." Although ABA
members agreed that the existing means of judicial conduct regulation were
ineffective,2 9 they viewed questions of judicial discipline as implicating distinct
legal and reputational concerns, which they were ill suited to address.3 o Even
25. See, e.g., M.K. Harris, Judges, 4 CAL. BAR Ass'N PROC. 10 (1913) (expressing con-
cern regarding judicial misconduct in the first decade of the twentieth century);
Peter J. Shields, The Judicial Office, 3 CAL. BAR Ass'N PROC. 39 (1912) (same).
26. See, e.g., Nelson v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W. 337 (Ky. App. 1908); Fowler v. Harri-
son, 42 S.E. 159 (S.C. 1902); ABA, CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 22 (1908);
Sharswood's Ethics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 83-84 (1907).
27. ABA, CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908); James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.
1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2402-05 (2003).
28. The Origin and Adoption of the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial
Ethics, 52 JUDICATURE 387 (1969) [hereinafter Origin and Adoption] (reviewing the
history of the Canons).
29. Existing means of state judicial conduct regulation were limited to removal
processes provided for by federal and state constitutions, including impeachment,
legislative address, judicial recall, and criminal sanctions. These forms of regula-
tion targeted only the most egregious forms of behavior and were rarely used.
Burke Shartel, Retirement & Removal of Judges, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 133, 147 (1936);
see also Edward J. Schoenbaum, A Historical Look at Judicial Discipline, 54
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1977) (reviewing the infrequency with which these mechan-
isms were used).
30. Some thought that if discipline was needed, it meant that the wrong individuals
had been chosen as judges. See Harris, supra note 25, at 29. Others worried that
new forms of discipline would lead only to a greater decline in public opinion of
judiciaries. Charles Boston, the lawyer who would ultimately become the principal
drafter of the judicial canons, argued that promulgating analogous canons for
judges would send a troublesome message. Bowie, supra note 1. At the time, there
was "agitation for a... recall of judicial decisions," and "it was not deemed wise
to add fuel to that flame by intimating through the adoption of Canons of Judicial




those who believed that articulated standards of judicial ethics were desirable
agreed that "it was not the proper role of the bar to impose standards on the
judiciary ... [as] such canons would more appropriately be developed within
the judiciary.""
As instances of judicial misconduct continued, and the threat of unfavora-
ble public perceptions of the legal system increased, the prevailing sentiment
shifted. One scandal in particular-news that a federal judge was supplement-
ing his $7500 judicial salary with an additional $42,50o as Commissioner of
Baseball3 -- highlighted to bar leaders that judicial misconduct was eroding the
profession's legitimacy." The ABA's Executive Committee responded by ap-
pointing a committee to draft standards of judicial conduct in 1922. Two years
later, the ABA House of Delegates adopted its first Canons of Judicial Ethics.3 4
The drafters of the Canons continued to express a deferential view of judi-
ciaries as distinct and hierarchically superior institutions. The Committee on
Judicial Ethics explained that the Canons were "a guide and reminder to the
judiciary and for the enlightenment of others, concerning what the bar expects
from those of its members who assume judicial office."" Accordingly, the
Canons' drafters did not presume the authority to impose standards on judicia-
ries. Rather, they directed their guidance toward lawyers as they ascended to the
bench. In this way, the drafters both justified their role in the drafting process
and minimized the Canons' threat to the functioning of judiciaries.
Several state and local bar associations took a more aggressive view of their
roles in reform.3' The California State Bar, for example, attempted to discipline
31. See Origin and Adoption, supra note 28; see also Albert M. Kales, Methods of Select-
ing and Retiring Judges, ni J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 133 (1928); Albert Kales, Methods of
Selecting and Retiring Judges in a Metropolitan District, 52 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 1, n1 (1914).
32. The Landis Case, 7 A.B.A. J. 87 (1921).
33. One delegate to the 1921 ABA Convention asked, "[W]hat use is it for the Associa-
tion to prescribe Canons of Ethics for the regulation of the conduct of active prac-
titioners, if it knew that a man on whom the judicial ermine had fallen had
yielded to the temptations of avarice and private gain?" Forty-Fourth Annual Asso-
ciation Meeting, 7 A.B.A. J. 470, 477 (1921).
34. JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs § 1.01 (2007); see CANONS
or JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/1924-canons.authcheckdam.pdf.
35. Final Report and Proposed Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 449, 449 (1923); see
also CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS pmbl. (1924) (stating that the ABA was adopting
them "as a proper guide and reminder for judges, and as indicating what the
people have a right to expect from them").
36. This approach was taken in Florida and Illinois. See infra note 41. Most bar associ-
ations followed the ABA's intended approach and adopted the Canons as persua-
sive but not binding guidance. See Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 414 (1972) (reviewing the process
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a judge for failure to comply with the Canons." It justified its action by refer-
ence to the requirement, advanced by the bar in the first half of the nineteenth
century, that judges have formal legal training." Given that judges were lawyers
first, the state bar asserted, they were properly subject to the bar's jurisdiction
and disciplinary authority.39 The California Supreme Court rejected this
approach, explaining that while judges may have been lawyers before ascending
to the bench, they were not members of the state bar and thus "not subject to
[its] jurisdiction, control and processes." 40 The California court thereby drew a
distinction between a judge's background as a lawyer, which it conceded, and a
judge's identity as a member of the state bar, which it did not. Because legal
training was a well-established requirement of most judicial offices, the first link
posed little threat to the existing power dynamic between judiciaries and the
profession. Accepting a judge's identity as a member of the state bar, however,
would have represented a significant encroachment on judicial power. Follow-
ing California's lead, other state high courts similarly rejected bar associations'
authority to enforce the Canons by disciplining individual judges. 41
In many states, bar associations pursued an alternative approach. Conced-
ing the bar's inability to discipline a judge, but again relying on a judge's identi-
ty as a lawyer, these bar associations encouraged state high courts to enforce the
Canons under their inherent judicial authority to regulate the practice of law. 42
through which most states adopted the Canons "in the same spirit in which they
were drafted-as a guide to the conscience of the individual judge").
37. State Bar of Cal. v. Superior Court, 278 P. 432, 433-34 (Cal. 1929).
38. DORIS MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1986). Establishing this requirement was part of
the bar's larger project of using the judiciary's image, prestige, and status as a
branch of government to forward its own position. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi,
Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of the Israeli Judiciary, 31 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 76o, 775 n.65 (2001).
39. State Bar of Cal., 278 P. at 433-34.
40. Id. at 439.
41. See, e.g., In re Investigation, 93 So. 2d 6o (Fla. 1957) (rejecting the Florida State
Bar's authority to discipline a circuit judge); In re Harriss, 4 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1936);
In re Strahl, 195 N.Y.S. 385, 387-88 (App. Div. 1922); see also Legal Ethics, Power To
Discipline Judges for Misconduct in Office, 32 ILL. L. REV. 118, 120 (1938) (explaining
that "disciplinary machinery [in Illinois] can be set in motion by petition of the
bar associations, but official action can be taken only by the Supreme Court
itself').
42. See Martineau, supra note 36, at 413 (summary of states' approaches to regulation
of judicial conduct in the wake of promulgation of the Canons); Philbrick McCoy,
A Note on Judicial Ethics in California, 22 S. CAL. L. REV. 240, 255 (1949). It was the
bar itself that had persuaded courts to recognize their inherent powers to regulate
the power of law in its efforts to curb the unauthorized practice of law on a




State high courts responded in varying ways. Some adopted this position and
disciplined judges as lawyers. 43 Some disciplined judges pursuant to a constitu-
tional grant of supervisory power over lower courts44 or an inherent authority
over the administration of justice.45 And some insisted that even courts lacked
authority to enforce the Canons and discipline judges.46
Throughout their opinions addressing the enforceability of the Canons,
and despite their varied approaches, courts continued to embrace and express
the traditional view of judiciaries as distinct institutions allied with, but supe-
rior to, the legal profession. They drew a distinction between lawyers, who were
properly subject to court supervision, and judges, who required freedom from
all outside interference in order to successfully perform their jobs.4 7 In their
Bootleggers"-The Role of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Court's Inhe-
rent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68 (2009).
43. See, e.g., In re Spriggs, 284 P. 521 (Ariz. 1930); In re Littell, 294 N.E.2d 126, 130-31
(Ind. 1973); In re Ruby, 105 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1952); In re Mattera, 168 A.2d 38,
41-42 (N.J. 1961) (citing other grounds as well); Jenkins v. Or. State Bar, 405 P.2d
525 (Or. 1965); Schoolfield v. Tenn. Bar Ass'n, 353 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. 1961); In re
Laughlin, 265 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. 1954); In re Stolen, 214 N.W. 379 (Wis. 1927);
In re Johnson, 568 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1977).
44. See, e.g., Cusack v. Howlett, 254 N.E.2d 506, 511-12 (Ill. 1969); In re Judges of Mun.
Court, 188 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Iowa 1971); In re Mattera, 168 A.2d at 41-42 (citing
other grounds as well).
45. See, e.g., In re Mattera, 168 A.2d at 41-42 (citing other grounds as well); In re
Heuermann, 240 N.W.2d 603, 607 (S.D. 1976); In re Code of Judicial Ethics, 153
N.W.2d 873, 874 (Wis. 1967) (citing other grounds as well).
46. See, e.g., Steiner v. Moore, 213 So. 2d 404, 406 (Ala. 1968); In re Hearings Concern-
ing Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465 (Colo. 1956); In re Proposed Disciplinary Action, 103
So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. 1958); In re Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky. 1959); In re
Meraux, 12 SO. 2d 798 (La. 1943); In re Graham, 114 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Mich. 1962);
In re Watson, 286 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1955); Nix v. Standing Comm. on Judicial Per-
formance, 422 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. 1966); In re Woodward, 384 P.2d no, 113 (Utah
1963); In re Carney, 30 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1944).
47. Some courts sought to preclude any entity-bar association, state court, or state
legislature-from proceeding against a judge for purposes of regulating judicial
conduct. See, e.g., In re Colo. Bar Ass'n, 325 P.2d 932, 937 (Colo. 1958) (explaining
that "[t]he constitution fixes the remedy at impeachment"); In re Investigation of
Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 1957) (concluding that the independence of
the judiciary is "safe-guarded in that the House has the sole power of impeach-
ment and the Senate is vested with the sole power to try impeachments"); In re
Woodward, 384 P.2d at 113 (concluding that "[j]udges, in the constitutional
sense ... are amenable only to the constitutional sanctions for removal"). Other
courts accepted the possibility of discipline, but defined the requisite authority as
residing exclusively within the judiciary. See, e.g., In re Judges of Mun. Court, 188
N.W.2d at 358 (finding the authority to discipline judges while emphasizing that
"[t]he independence of all the courts in the exercise of judicial functions must be
carefully protected and respected" and clarifying that the discipline cannot be im-
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opinions, courts were also deliberate in characterizing their ties with the profes-
sion as vertical rather than horizontal. Drawing on rhetoric of the legal profes-
sion emphasizing the civic-minded nature of legal practice, the courts suggested
that judges held themselves to high ethical standards even in the absence of
enforceable codes of conduct.4' But they clarified that judges, having assumed
government office, were now above the legal profession. Lawyers played an im-
portant quasi-governmental role as officers of the court, 49 but remained behol-
den to judiciaries as the regulators of the practice of law. 0
plemented in a way that "dictate[s] to the judges how judicial issues in individual
cases shall be decided").
48. See, e.g., In re Littell, 294 N.E.2d at 130-31 (observing an "interrelationship between
disciplinary rules applicable to attorneys and the code of judicial conduct and eth-
ics" and explaining that "a licensed attorney, while serving as a judge, is subject to
the stringent requirements of both"); In re Mattera, 168 A.2d at 41 ("In terms of a
rational connection with fitness at the bar, behavior of an attorney in judicial of-
fice cannot be insulated from the demands of professional ethics. On the contrary,
the judge's role is so intimate a part of the process of justice that misbehavior as a
judge must inevitably reflect upon qualification for membership at the bar."); Jen-
kins, 405 P.2d at 528 ("As far as his duty to his profession is concerned, a judge is a
lawyer whose labors are performed behind the bench instead of before it."); Nix,
422 P.2d at 203 (Halley, C.J., dissenting) ("When an attorney becomes a judge, he
does not cease to be an attorney and a member of the bar.").
49. See, e.g., In re Colo. Bar Ass'n, 325 P.2d at 937 ("It would be impossible for the
court to effectively function in this field without the assistance of the members of
the bar."); In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (Neb. 1937)
("[Lawyers] are in effect an important part of the judiciary system of this state. It
is their duty honestly and ably to aid the courts in securing an efficient adminis-
tration of justice."). This was the traditional and long-standing view. See, e.g., In re
Day, 54 N.E. 646, 652 (Ill. 1899) (describing lawyers as "persons who assist in the
administration of justice as its officers").
50. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. McCain, 330 So. 2d 712, 718 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., concur-
ring) ("The Florida Bar as an arm of this Court is charged to act responsibly. If it
acts irresponsibly this Court has the power and the duty to impose appropriate
sanctions against the offending members."); In re Integration of Neb. State Bar
Ass'n, 275 N.W. at 268 ("The practice of law is so intimately connected and bound
up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the
right to define and regulate its practice naturally and logically belongs to the judi-
cial department of our state government."). Even as state high courts delegated
regulatory authority back to state bar discipline committees, they frequently cha-
racterized the committees as their own agents rather than agents of the state bar
association. See, e.g., In re Colo. Bar Ass'n, 325 P.2d at 936 ("[The state bar discipli-
nary committee] functioning in disciplinary proceedings... ceases to be a repre-
sentative of the bar association and becomes a committee of this court, and as
such is responsible solely to the court."); In re Investigation of Circuit Judge, 93
So. 2d 601, 608 (Fla. 1957) ("In disciplinary matters the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar serves merely as an adjunct or administrative agency of this Court




Gradually, the bar began challenging this traditional model of the relation-
ship between judiciaries and the profession. As judicial misconduct continued,"
and courts remained reluctant to enforce discipline," the bar began advancing a
new model-judiciaries as subsidiary parts of the legal profession." Reliance on
this model represented a significant change in strategy. Previously, the bar had
used the descriptive claim that judges were lawyers in order to justify bar asso-
ciation or court authority to discipline individual judges. With the new model,
the bar made a normative claim that the organized legal profession was properly
conceived of as the broader institution, which encompassed judiciaries. The
new strategy enabled the bar to assume a much more extensive and influential
role in judicial conduct regulation.
Bar leaders advanced their views in law review articles and bar journals.
They explained that if judiciaries were subsumed into the legal profession,
self-regulation of judiciaries was regulation of and by "the legal profession-
51. See Judicial Propriety, 56 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (1970) (noting that "(sleldom, if ever, has
judicial conduct come under such close public scrutiny in the United States as it
has during the last two years"); Theodore G. Garfield et al., What Court Reform
Can Do for You: Improving the Image of the Judge, the Lawyer and the Organized
Bar, 49 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 133 (1965) (noting a crisis of public confidence in the
courts); see also RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1979) (describing "the series of judicial
scandals that achieved widespread publicity in the 1960s and 1970s," which
"created pressure to strengthen judicial disciplinary mechanisms").
52. Many courts were perceived to be passive in their enforcement efforts. See Jack E.
Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1121, 1125 (1966)
(noting that vesting disciplinary authority in a state high court "depend [ed upon
the willingness of the state supreme court and chief justice to take a strong lead,
which not many high courts and chief justices are able or inclined to do"). Others
continued to treat the Canons as offering only persuasive guidance. See supra note
46. Even courts that purported to enforce the Canons took approaches that were
perceived to be insufficient. For example, some courts held their authority to be
limited to conduct involving moral turpitude or other conduct that would subject
a lawyer to disbarment, which precluded discipline for a wide array of problemat-
ic conduct that had prompted calls for reform in the first place. See, e.g., In re
Spriggs, 284 P. 521 (Ariz. 1930); In re Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1959); In re
Bd. of Comm'rs of the State Bar, 337 P.2d 400 (N.M. 1959); see also Jonathan T.
Swain, The Procedures of Judicial Discipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190 (1976) (review-
ing the states that took this approach).
53. See, e.g., Jack Frankel, Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judges for Cause in Califor-
nia, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 72, 73 (1963) (describing the regulation of the judiciary as a
part of professional self-regulation); McCoy, supra note 42, at 241 ("[J]udges of
courts of record, although set apart for special duty in the administration of jus-
tice, are also members of the bar, and so are bound by all the obligations of the le-
gal profession." (quoting Justice Conrey) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also HALLIDAY, supra note lo, at 172 (noting the same reversal in the Illinois Bar
Association's efforts to reform the Illinois judicial codes in the early 1970s).
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lawyers and judges alike." 4 Purporting to offer wisdom that they had gained
from their own experience with regulation, prominent lawyers explained that
bench and bar should work together to institute more effective judicial discip-
line mechanisms." Doing so would restore public confidence in the courts: "Bar
leaders realized some time ago that the image of the bar would be enhanced, not
hurt, by taking steps to censure and disbar unworthy lawyers. The same prin-
ciple applies to judges.""' Lawyers therefore justified their role in reform by ref-
erence to the profession's civic commitments and quasi-governmental role.
With public and judicial attention focused on the bar's civic orientation,
bar leaders became more assertive with their views on judicial discipline. They
explained that the disciplinary system could not remain within the exclusive
control of judges-"[o]therwise, the ethical scheme is vulnerable to the criti-
cism that it is self-protective." 7 They also emphasized the importance of man-
datory and enforceable standards of judicial conduct.'" As one lawyer explained,
"The most stringent of ethical standards are of little consequence unless the
public is convinced that the standards are uniformly and vigorously enforced." 9
During the second half of the twentieth century, the bar's shift in approach
and in rhetoric empowered it to assume two influential roles in the reform of
judicial conduct regulation." First, state bars, working centrally through the
ABA, took leadership roles in establishing state judicial conduct commissions-
54. Jack E. Frankel, Judicial Ethics and Discipline for the 1970s, 54 JUDICATURE 18, 18
(1970).
55. See, e.g., William T. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal
with It, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 153 (1970) ("[T]he principal policy objec-
tive of a procedure for dealing with judicial misconduct... is to insure society's
confidence in the formal system of dispute resolution."); Frankel, supra note 52, at
n18; Frank Greenburg, The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 458, 462
(1976); Gerald C. Snyder, Rules of Conduct, 53 JUDICATURE 307, 313 (1970) ("The
twenty-five standards of judicial conduct, a living 'rule' of conduct by judges, will
materially assist in the restoration of public confidence in the judiciary and in the
promotion of justice.").
56. Frankel, supra note 52, at III.
57. John Weistart, Foreword, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (1970) (asking "whether
the judiciary has the capacity to perform adequately the regulatory function which
would be necessary to satisfy the recently surfaced public concern with judicial
ethics" and concluding that "[t] he standards for conduct perhaps are best devised
by a body structured to permit formal input from community sources. Otherwise,
the ethical scheme is vulnerable to the criticism that it is self-protective.").
58. Martineau, supra note 36, at 410.
59. Greenburg, supra note 55, at 463.
60. Joseph Tydings, The Congress and the Courts: Helping the Judiciary To Help Itself,
52 A.B.A. J. 321, 325 (1966) (noting that "[t]he organized Bar has often taken the
lead in efforts to modernize court machinery, particularly on the state level," and




independent committees authorized to investigate complaints, file and prose-
cute charges, and recommend or impose sanctions." After the California State
Bar played an important role in establishing the first modern judicial conduct
commission in 1960,6, several other state bars, acting with the centralized sup-
port of the ABA, followed its lead.6 1 By 1981, every state in the country had a
modern judicial conduct commission.4
Second, the bar's new approach empowered the ABA to assert itself as the
drafter and reviewer of codes of judicial conduct. Responding to growing criti-
cism of the 1924 Canons, the ABA appointed a committee to draft a revised
code, to be stated in mandatory terms.6 1 The ABA House of Delegates adopted
the revised code at its 1972 annual meeting and created a special committee to
promote its adoption in the states.
In the post-Watergate atmosphere of distrust of governmental
self-regulation 6 7 it was not difficult for the ABA's special committee to make
61. I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 19-27 (2d ed. 1980).
62. See Frankel, supra note 53, at 85 (describing the bar's role in creating the Califor-
nia Judicial Conduct Commission).
63. See Robert W. Galvin, Regulating Judicial Misconduct in Massachusetts, 27 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 189, 208-09 (1993). For histories of the processes in various states
noting the role of the bar, see James Alfini, Shailey Gupta-Brietzke & James
McMartin IV, Dealing with Judicial Misconduct in the States: Judicial Independence,
Accountability and Reform, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 889, 891-92, 908 (2007).
64. TESITOR & SINKS, supra note 61, at 19-27. These commissions fall within two
categories. Forty-one states have one-tier commissions, which handle all phases of
the process, from investigating complaints to either imposing sanctions or
recommending them to the state's highest court. The remaining states have
two-tier systems, in which a first panel investigates complaints and files and pros-
ecutes formal charges, while a second panel adjudicates the charges and, where
appropriate, imposes sanctions. Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Judicial Conduct Organi-
zations, 76 Ky. L.J. 811, 811-12 (1988).
65. In contrast to the aspirational tone of the 1924 Canons, the 1972 Code's Preface
stated: "The canons and text establish mandatory standards. . . . It is hoped that
all jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary proce-
dures for its enforcement." CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1972).
66. E. Wayne Thode, The Code ofJudicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts,
1977 UTAH L. REV. 395, 395 (1977).
67. The Judicial Tenure Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 25 (1977) (statement of
Rep. Nunn) (urging action by all branches of government to restore public confi-
dence in government after Watergate); JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE
OF JUSTICE 225-26 (1974) (linking the Watergate scandal to the growth of cynicism
over the quality of the nation's leadership).
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the case for enforceable standards of conduct.68 But its strategies in promoting
the 1972 Code went beyond advocating adoption and had the ultimate effect of
solidifying the ABA's role in future drafting processes. One member of the
committee addressed the concern that adoption could lock state judiciaries into
unchangeable standards of conduct by explaining that the code would be
"review[ed] periodically . .. for the purpose of assessing its relevance to current
conditions and problems."'9 If the ABA were to perform this function, states
could then decide whether to adopt any such amendments, at relatively little
cost in time or money.
The ABA's strategies were effective. By the time the ABA promulgated a
new code of judicial conduct in 1990, the 1972 version had been adopted by
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia. 70 By the time it published a
third version in 2007, twenty of those states, the District of Columbia, and two
previous non-Code states7 ' had adopted new codes based on the 1990 version.72
Additional states adopted portions of the 1990 Code while retaining portions of
the 1972 Code.73 Since the 2007 amendments, nineteen states have adopted the
68. Charles Gardner Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of In-
dividual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS 21, 30-31 (Keith J. Bybee ed.,
2007).
69. Martineau, supra note 36, at 418; see also Harrison, supra note 18, at 257 (noting
that "significant, often dramatic, developments in the legal, social, and political
environment" since the drafting of the 1990 Code called for a comprehensive re-
view of the Code).
70. The three exceptions were Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. ALFINI ET AL.,
supra note 34, § 1.03 n.17. Other states' codes were virtually identical to the Model
Code. Moreover, courts' descriptions of their adoption processes lend support to
the notion that adoption was generally uncritical. See Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Dis-
cipline & Disability Comm'n, 130 S.W.3d 524, 531 (Ark. 2003) ("In 1972, the Ameri-
can Bar Association published its Model Code of Judicial Conduct and in 1973,
this court adopted it."); Spector v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 392 N.E.2d
552, 558 (N.Y. 1979) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (describing New York's Code as
based on "the seminal model" approved by the ABA). Even where there were dif-
ferences, they were presented as fairly superficial. See, e.g., In re K.E.M., 89 S.W. 3d
814, 827 n.15 (Tex. App. 2002) ("The American Bar Association approved its
[M]odel Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972. The Texas Supreme Court adopted the
substance of that code, with minor changes, in 1974.").
71. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, § 1.03 n.18. The two previously non-Code states were
Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Id.
72. Id. In some cases, states altered the language of the code more than they had with
the 1972 Code, but the changes were generally not substantive. See, e.g., In re Code
of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1994) ("The new Code of Judicial
Conduct we have approved is substantially the same as the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct adopted by the ABA in 1990.").





new code in whole or in part.74 Currently, every state has a judicial code of con-
duct modeled after one or more of the ABA's codes.75 The practical effect of the
reform of judicial conduct regulation in the states, therefore, was to instantiate
the bar as a leader in the reform process and the ABA as the authoritative actor
in future drafting processes .7
B. The ABA Model Codes: Preferential Access and Tightening Ties
The ABA and state bars were successful in cultivating influence in the
process of state judicial conduct reform, at least in part because they promised
that their efforts would ensure judicial quality, legitimacy, and independence.
But while purporting to act in the public interest-as protectors and defenders
of the courts-they were also promoting their members' private interests. Start-
ing with the 1972 Code, the ABA used its new position as drafter of the revised
codes to secure for lawyers and legal organizations preferential access to judicia-
ries through two categories of code provisions."7 The first category drew a
distinction between law-related and non-law-related events and organizations
and granted preferential treatment to the former. The second addressed social
74. Since 2007, nineteen states have implemented the 2007 Code, including Mon-
tana-the only state previously to have had a code not based on the ABA's Model
Code. See ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 81 (2009); ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009);
COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2011); DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010); HAW. SuP. CT. R. 5
(2009); IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009); IOWA SUP. CT. R. 51 (2010);
KAN. SuP. CT. R. 6oiB (2009); MD. CT. APP. R. 16-813 (2010); MINN. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009); MONT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009); NEB.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2008); NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010);
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009); OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2011); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010); WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2011); WYo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009). Nine of those states
previously had the 1990 Code and nine had the 1972 Code. ALFINI ET AL., supra
note 34, § 1.03, nn-17-18.
75. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, § 1.03 (noting that Montana, which has since
adopted a code modeled after the 2007 ABA Code, is "the only non-Code state");
id. § 1.03 n.19 (listing the five states that have combinations of the 1972 and 1990
Codes). The only state with provisions that stray from the Model Codes' provi-
sions is Oregon. Oregon's code represents a combination of 1972 Code provisions,
1990 Code provisions, and some additional non-Code provisions, such as rules
calling for advisory opinions. The order of these provisions does not track any
version of the Model Code. See OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. i-ioi to 6-102
(2002).
76. See HALLIDAY, supra note lo, at 199 (describing an advisory role as intermediate in
Halliday's four forms of bar agency).
77. Cf DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 143-44 (2000) (describing the self-interested nature of standards of
attorney conduct).
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hospitality and gifts and allowed frequent, informal interactions between indi-
vidual judges and lawyers. In contrast to the bar's initial focus on deterring
judicial misconduct-which had justified its involvement in reform in the first
place-these provisions were affirmatively oriented toward conditioning
judicial conduct by encouraging judicial involvement in the legal profession.
The first category of new provisions facilitated judicial participation in bar
associations and other law-related organizations. Viewing the 1924 Canons'
attitude toward judges' involvement in legal organizations as "at most
lukewarm,"" the 1972 drafters included a new canon that not only authorized
but actively encouraged such involvement.79 They added a new provision per-
mitting judges to assist in certain fundraising activities for bar associations and
legal organizations,o while continuing to prohibit parallel conduct for other
types of civic and community organizations.' These provisions aligned with
ABA efforts, begun at the turn of the century, to increase the number of judges
in its membership in order to engage judges with the practicing bar." They also
bolstered the bar's claim that judiciaries were a part of the legal profession.
The drafters of the 1990 Code eliminated the differential treatment of legal
and non-legal organizations in the text of the Canons," but continued to
encourage judicial participation in legal organizations through code commen-
tary.4 The decision to lessen the preferential treatment of legal organizations in
the rules themselves was criticized,"* and the drafters of the 2007 Code brought
78. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 76 (1973).
79. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C cmt. (1972) ("To the extent his time
permits, he is encouraged to [contribute to the development of the legal system]
either independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other
organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.").
80. Id. Canon 4C.
81. Id. Canon 4C & cmt.
82. Second Day: Morning Session, 38 A.B.A. REP. 30 (1915).
83. LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 30 (1992) (ex-
plaining that "the Committee became convinced that all of the activities of a judge
that are engaged in outside the realm of judicial duties ought to be subject to a
single set of overarching principles" and that as a result, it "combined in a single
Canon 4 the subject matter of Canons 4, 5 and 6 of the 1972 Code").
84. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B cmt. (1990) ("[A] judge is
encouraged to [contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice], either independently or through a bar association,
judicial conference or other organization dedicated to the improvement of the
law."); see also id. ("As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice.").
85. See, e.g., Mark Scott Bagula & Robert C. Coates, Trustees of the Justice System:
Quasi-Judicial Activity and the Failure of the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial




back a sharper distinction to be "more encouraging" of judicial cooperation
with the practicing legal profession." In addition to reiterating a judge's special
competence to contribute to the development of the law,'8 the drafters empha-
sized a judge's duty to support professionalism within the practicing bar." The
drafters also rested several new provisions on a distinction between law-related
and non-law-related events and organizations, which the reporter to the draft-
ing committee, Professor Charles Geyh, described as a "theme that occurs
throughout Canon 3-"'9
Thus, the 2007 Code permits court facilities and other court resources to be
used in connection with law-related events but not non-law-related events." It
provides that a judge may attend a fee-waived event sponsored by a law-related
organization regardless of the cost to other participants,9' but may attend a
fee-waived event sponsored by a non-law-related organization only if all partic-
ipants attend for free.92 It permits a judge to be a featured speaker at a fundrais-
ing event,93 and to solicit membership even where solicitation constitutes a
form of fundraising,94 for law-related but not non-law-related organizations.
The 2007 drafting committee's reporter justified this last distinction by refer-
ence to ties between the profession and judiciaries. He explained that participa-
tion in fundraising and membership solicitation for "a law-related organization,
of differentiating between types of extrajudicial conduct was desirable so as to
encourage conduct by judges aimed at improving the legal system).
86. ABA, REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT 34 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/mcjC-2007
.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that the revised Comment to Rule 3.1 was meant
to be "somewhat more encouraging than was the 1990 Code so that judges
will reach out to the communities of which they are a part, and avoid isolating
themselves").
87. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 & cmt. 1 (2007) ("Judges are uniquely
qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice, such as by speaking, writing, teaching, or partic-
ipating in scholarly research projects.").
88. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 4.
89. 2007 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION, supra note 86, at 50 (explaining that "[t]his
distinction between events and organizations that are or are not law-related is
another theme that occurs throughout Canon 3").
90. Id. at 33.
91. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.13(C)(2)(a), R. 3.14 (2007).
92. 2007 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION, supra note 86, at 50.
93. Id. at 41-42.
94. Id. at 41 ("[T]he Commission decided to limit the permission granted to solicit
membership to membership in law-related organizations-one of several places
in Canon 3 where this line is drawn.").
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such as a bar association or moot court society, would be perceived as more
natural or more appropriate than . .. [for] a fine arts society or the American
Red Cross."95
The second category of new Model Code provisions granting the bar
preferential treatment allowed frequent, informal social interactions between
individual judges and lawyers. The drafters of the 1972 Code employed a new
"ordinary social hospitality" standard, which they described as "more liberal [in
comparison to the 1924 Canons] in allowing judges to accept certain types of
gifts under certain conditions."' On the face of the rule, the new standard
applied equally to all of a judge's social interactions. But the drafter's explana-
tions and official comments revealed a desire to facilitate bench-bar interac-
tions. In rejecting the 1924 Canons' flat prohibition on judges' receipt of gifts,
presents, or favors from litigants or lawyers appearing before them,
97 the draf-
ters explained that judges should be encouraged to foster bonds within the legal
profession.9' Accordingly, new provisions permitted judges and their spouses to
accept invitations to lawyers' social events99 and to bar-related functions or
activities "devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration of justice.""oo
The drafters of the 1990 and 2007 Codes revised the 1972 provisions regard-
ing judge-lawyer social interactions to make them even more permissive. While
prohibiting receipt of gifts or things of value from lawyers or law firms that had
or likely would come before a judge,'1 the 1990 Code permitted receipt of ordi-
nary social hospitality from all lawyers.0 2 The official annotation explained that
"ordinary social hospitality" could include, among other things, "dinners and
receptions, where the sponsoring bar association pays the judge's expenses" 03
95. Id.; see also id. at 42 (providing the same rationale for the rule allowing a judge to
be a featured speaker or participant at an event that has a fundraising purpose if,
but only if, the organization is law-related).
96. MILORD, supra note 83, at 41 (describing the 1972 revisions process).
97. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1924), available at http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/abamigrated/cpr/pic/1924_canons.authcheckdam
.pdf (a judge "should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from
lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be sub-
mitted to him for judgment").
98. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A cmt. (1972); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 4A cmt. (1990) ("Complete separation of a judge from
extra-judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not become
isolated from the community in which the judge lives.").
99. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A( 4)(b) (1972).
1oo. Id. Canon 5C(4)(a).
101. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4D( 5)(h) (1990).
102. ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 301 (1990).




and "invitations to a law firm's holiday party, open house or summer picnic."10 4
The drafters of the 2007 Code went even further. Viewing the 1990 Code's ban
on gifts and substantial invitations from lawyers appearing before a judge'o as
"more stringent than necessary,""'6 they added provisions allowing such gifts
and invitations if reported."'7 Both the 1990 and 2007 Codes grant judges vir-
tually unrestricted discretion to receive gifts and invitations from lawyers who
do not appear before them,"' even though it is virtually impossible to predict
which lawyers will appear before a judge in any given year.
As these provisions reveal, the ABA and state bars were forwarding their
powerful private interests in drafting and promoting adoption of the revised
model codes. While purporting to act exclusively in a civic-oriented role as a
protector and defender of the courts, they were also securing for their members
preferential treatment and preferential access to judges. Preferential access, in
turn, tightened the bar's connection with state judiciaries, reinforced the rhe-
toric of judiciaries as subsidiary parts of the legal profession, and empowered
the profession to exert continuing influence over judicial conduct regulation.
The net result was an increase in the practicing bar's power at the expense of
judicial autonomy.
II. Too CLOSE FOR COMFORT: THE DANGERS OF THE BAR'S MODEL
The legal profession's civic and private interests are not mutually exclusive,
and the inevitable tension between them need not preclude beneficially close
ties with state judiciaries. But through the process of reforming judicial conduct
regulations, the bar's dual orientation manifested itself in troubling ways, allow-
ing it to promote its private interests under the cover of its civic commitments.
As a result, the bar's role in judicial conduct reform interlocked the interests of
judiciaries and the profession to the detriment of both. Prior to the reform
movement, judiciaries were largely self-governed and exclusively oriented
toward the state. Likewise, the profession, just coming into its heyday, was
largely autonomous and self-governing. By forwarding the position that judicia-
ries were a subsidiary part of the profession and by creating judicial conduct
rules that reinforced that position, the bar created the appearance that judicia-
104. Id. at 303-04.
105. Id.
106. 2007 REPORTER'S ExPLANATION, supra note 86, at 50.
107. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.15 (2007) ("Reports made in
compliance with this Rule shall be filed as public documents in the office of the
clerk of the court on which the judge serves or other office designated by law, and,
when technically feasible, posted by the court or office personnel on the court's
website.").
1o8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3 .13(B)(2) (2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 4D( 5 )(h) (1990).
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ries, like the bar, were oriented in part toward private economic and political
interests. Similarly, the bar imputed to itself a heightened orientation toward
state interests.!o" In this Part, I argue that, by interlocking the interests of bench
and bar in this way, reform of state judicial conduct regulation has compro-
mised the independence and legitimacy of both institutions.
A. The Threat to Judiciaries
In advocating judicial conduct reform throughout the twentieth century,
the ABA and state bars promised that enforceable codes of conduct would
increase public confidence in the courts, thereby strengthening judicial legiti-
macy and bolstering judicial independence.no But by empowering the bar's
private interests, the reform process has jeopardized both of these core values of
political liberalism. In successfully claiming authority to direct the process of
reform, the bar increased its own power at the expense of judicial power. In
successfully promoting conduct provisions that permit informal and unmoni-
tored interactions between lawyers and judges, the bar created opportunities for
and appearances of improper private influence over judges. In both of these
ways, the reform process and the resulting codes of conduct have threatened the
independence and legitimacy of state judiciaries.
Autonomy from the profession is infrequently discussed as an axis of judi-
cial independence. The scholarly literature has traditionally focused on the judi-
ciary's independence from the political branches of government, primarily in
the literature addressing the federal judiciary,"' and independence from
lo9. Only by claiming an orientation toward the state could the bar successfully trans-
form its technical expertise into a claim of moral authority. Cf HALLIDAY, supra
note io, at 216-17 (describing how the Chicago Bar Association's efforts regarding
the state judiciary, which entailed both exerting control and attaining autonomy
from politics, represented an increased orientation toward the public arena of the
state).
io. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
inl. Some scholars have focused on the Framers' intent regarding separation of powers
and the early development of judicial review and judicial power in relation to
Congress and the President. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333 (1998); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Po-
litical Power, 54 REv. POL. 369 (1992). Some scholars focused on the key role
played by informal norms, working alongside formal constitutional protections,
in establishing and reinforcing judicial independence from the political branches
at key moments in American history. See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN
COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006); Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial
Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 909 (2007). Scholars
addressing the modern federal judiciary have focused on the proper nature and
level of dialogue between the judiciary, Congress, and the President. See, e.g., Ro-




political reprisals to unpopular decisions, primarily in the literature addressing
elected state judiciaries."2 A small but growing body of literature addresses the
potential threat posed by private interest groups,"' particularly in the context of
judicial selection and elections."4
Attention to private interests has increased since the Supreme Court's 2009
decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co."' The Caperton Court held that
where the impartiality and legitimacy of state court proceedings are compro-
mised by excessive campaign contributions, the Due Process Clause may
require judges to recuse themselves."' The holding of Caperton addressed cam-
paign contributions, but the facts highlight informal contacts as another point
of concern. In addition to making over three million dollars in campaign con-
JUDGES AND LEGISLATURES: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (1988); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled
Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1996) [hereinafter Geyh, Paradise Lost].
112. Work addressing state courts was largely nonexistent until the past several years.
See Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 323, 325 (2003) (noting that "[m]ost legal scholars who write about judicial
independence know nothing and care less about state courts"). But there is now a
steadily growing body of scholarship that measures state court independence in
relation to the electorate. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79
(1998); Stephen Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciary and Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995); Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Se-
lection Debate, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (20o8). Many scholars propose re-
forms to better insulate state judiciaries from partisan politics. See, e.g., SARA MA-
THIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS (1990);
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 43 (2003).
113. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
114. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 16, at 393; Gregory A. Caldeira, Marie Hojnacki &
John R. Wright, The Lobbying Activities of Organized Interests in Federal Judicial
Nominations, 62 J. POL. 51, 51-52 (2000); Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judi-
cial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1259, 1266 (2008); Maura Anne Shoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair,
and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 839 (1994).
115. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
116. In the months following the Supreme Court decision, a National Law Journal
article expressed a growing concern when it asked, "Is justice for sale?" and
observed that "[a]n unprecedented number of incumbent state judges are facing a
flood of special interest dollars aiming to kick them off the bench." Susan Liss &
Adam Skaggs, Is Justice for Sale?, NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 6, 2010), http://www.law.com/
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202471560436.
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tributions to one justice, the litigant in question vacationed with a second jus-
tice, all while his case was pending before both justices."'
Caperton underscores the importance of addressing autonomy from the le-
gal profession as an element of judicial independence. The Court's reasoning
suggests that in the hands of any group other than the bar or a legal organiza-
tion, the preferential access permitted by the ABA Codes would be viewed as an
unwarranted intrusion on the decisional autonomy of judges. Similarly, if any
other group had exerted the influence over the conduct reform process that was
exerted by the ABA, it would be viewed as a direct challenge to judicial inde-
pendence. The ABA's involvement, however, was uncritically accepted in the
states because of the profession's purported ability and inclination to protect
judicial independence while safeguarding the public interest."'
This acceptance ignored the reality that when the bar acts to influence the
legal occupation and the practice of law, its special attributes render it a particu-
larly powerful and potentially problematic private interest group.' 9 Existing
accounts of the salutary effects of interest group politics presuppose that com-
peting factions or interests exist to check undesirable interested outcomes.o20
But because of the bar's monopoly over legal practice, it acts free from compet-
ing interests when addressing matters directly related to the practice of law."'
117. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
n8. In explaining the ABA's role in the 1972 revision process, the reporter emphasized
the involvement of judges, noting that " [t]he ABA ... is not a 'private association
of lawyers.' Thousands of judges are members of the Association." THODE, supra
note 78, at 47. Others emphasized the role that the bar had traditionally taken in
many aspects of court reform. Tydings, supra note 60, at 325. Over time, the
ABA's role simply became accepted. Cf Kaufman, supra note 18, at 3 n-4 (noting
the entrustment of the revision process to an ABA committee).
119. See HALLIDAY, supra note lo, at 52; Charles L. Cappell & Terence C. Halliday, Pro-
fessional Projects of Elite Chicago Lawyers, 8 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 291, 293 (1983).
Studies of the political efficacy of the bar have affirmed this observation. Umbrella
bar associations have been plagued by collective action problems having to do
with specific political issues, but they have been politically effective in matters re-
lating to legal practice. See, e.g., MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFES-
SIONALISM: A SocIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 177 (1979); Cappell & Halliday, supra, at
293; Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New Problems and New
Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS' IDEALs/LAWYERs' PRAC-
TICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1, 7 (Robert L.
Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992).
120. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY (2005).
121. Partly for this reason and partly because of shared interests in matters relating to
legal practice, umbrella bar associations, which have been plagued by collective
action problems when advocating specific political positions, have been politically
effective in matters relating to legal practice. See LARSON, supra note 119, at 177;




Moreover, because the bar possesses specialized expertise, it acts outside of the
scope of effective monitoring by the public or a nonspecialized body such as a
legislature."'
The bar's political efficacy is further magnified when it seeks to influence
judicial conduct regulation. 3 In this context, the bar is not only working in its
occupational interests, but is also leveraging its close and unique relationship
with its regulators, state judiciaries. Bar influence over attorney conduct regula-
tion raises the specter of regulatory capture. Bar influence over judicial conduct
regulation raises an even more worrisome concern-that the bar will not only
capture but more explicitly control and co-opt power from its regulator, which
is itself a branch of government.
The dangers of control and co-optation were realized through the
twentieth-century process of judicial conduct regulation reform. The legal pro-
fession successfully persuaded judiciaries to defer to its views on judicial con-
duct, from views regarding desirable mechanisms and means of enforcement to
views regarding specific standards of conduct. It thereby took control of a key
judicial accountability mechanism, expanding its own power by convincing
judiciaries to cede a portion of their inherent authority.
The resulting code provisions pose a threat to judicial independence in two
principal ways. First, they allow behaviors that may create opportunities and
appearances of judicial bias and partiality. For example, they allow judges to
attend law-related, fee-waived (or expense-paid) educational trips, derided by
critics as "junkets,"12 4 which may appear to play a greater role in advancing the
political and ideological positions of their sponsors than in furthering the edu-
cation of their participants.12 5 Code provisions allow judges to accept gifts and
social invitations from lawyers who practice before them, which may appear to
compromise judges' decisional independence. And code provisions allow judges
122. See HALLIDAY, supra note io, at 374-75; DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITIcs APPROACH TO PoLICY
MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 9 (1999); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW
D. MCCUBBINs, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 33-34 (1991).
123. See Karpik, supra note 19, at 467; see also HALLIDAY, supra note io, at 52 (describ-
ing the legal profession as both a normative profession and a partially
state-constitutive profession, which conveys a "double increment of advantage" in
matters of collective action related to the profession).
124. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part
I-Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 539, 550-51
(1994).
125. See Green, supra note 18, at 942 (describing a 2000 study published by the
Community Rights Counsel that concluded that judicial seminars relating to envi-
ronmental law were "a veiled effort to lobby the judiciary" and noting that
"[s]ince at least 1979, privately funded programs for judicial education, particular-
ly in the area of law-and-economics, have been the subject of public discussion
and often public criticism").
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to solicit membership and participate in fundraising activities for legal
organizations, which may appear to use the prestige of judicial office to coerce
donations. Some commentators, including prominent federal judges, have sug-
gested that even membership in bar associations and other legal organizations
can create problematic appearances of judicial partiality."' In all of these cases,
appearances can be as harmful as realities.'2 7 When a judge's decisional auton-
omy appears compromised, regardless of whether it actually is, judicial legiti-
macy is diminished and judicial independence is threatened.
The second way in which the ABA Codes pose a threat to judicial indepen-
dence is that they allow the interpretation of ambiguous provisions to be condi-
tioned by bar norms, which include private interests and private orientations,
rather than by independent judicial norms, which ideally are oriented exclusive-
ly toward state and public interests. For example, the ABA Codes permit a judge
to accept invitations and "ordinary social hospitality" from a lawyer, even when
the lawyer regularly appears before the judge."' Commentary acknowledges the
126. Most prominently, former Chief Justice Rehnquist resigned his ABA membership
in 1992. Randall T. Shepard, Judicial Professionalism and the Relations Between
Judges and Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 223, 230 (2000).
Though he did not explicitly state his reasons, they were widely believed to relate
to the ABA's political positions and potentially problematic appearances. Id. The
following year, Judge Acker of the Northern District of Alabama resigned as well,
explicitly citing the need to avoid problematic appearances. Judge Acker described
the ABA as having joined the list of political organizations for which it was
improper for judges to belong because it "routinely takes official positions on is-
sues upon which I and other judges likely will be called upon to rule." Id. For an
overview of the debate regarding judicial participation in the ABA, see Diarmuid
F. O'Scannlain, What Role Should Judges Play in the ABA?: The Appellate Judges
Conference Position, 31 JUDGES J. 9 (1992); and William F. Womble, Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & M. Peter Moser, What Role Should Judges Play in the ABA?: The JAD
Position, 31 JUDGES' J. 9 (1992).
127. Some have argued that focusing on appearances-particularly "appearances of
impropriety"-is an ineffective or inappropriate means of addressing judicial
misconduct. See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1095, 1105 (2004) ("[T]he [appearance of impropriety) standard promotes
the wrong idea-that in order to keep judges from acting unethically, ethical rules
must prevent judges from appearing to act unethically... [and] that if judges
appear to be acting ethically, they probably are."). With respect to judicial con-
duct, as opposed to misconduct, appearances are critical. The appearance of bias
and partiality bears not just on decisional outcomes but also on judicial legitima-
cy, and can be as harmful to judicial legitimacy as actual bias and partiality.
128. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.13(B)(3) (2007) (ordinary social hospi-
tality); id. R. 3 .13(C)(2) (invitations); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4D(5)(c) (1990) (ordinary social hospitality); id. Canon 4 D(5)(h)
(representing the one exception by precluding invitations from lawyers appearing
before the judge); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C( 4)(b) (1972) (ordinary




difficulty of defining this standard with precision and explains the drafters' de-
cision to "permit[] the scope of permissible social hospitality to vary somewhat
from place to place, depending on local customs and practices." 2 9 Given the ex-
tensive contacts that the preferential access provisions encourage, judges may
interpret these and other flexible standards from within a culture driven by bar
norms and lawyer influence. And if they do so, they may engage in conduct
that, while not technically proscribed by the codes, may appear unacceptable
and improper to the public.3 o In a recent and particularly egregious example, it
came to light that the "ordinary social hospitality" that a state supreme court
justice had accepted from law firms that regularly appeared before him included
"thousands of dollars in gifts, rounds of golf, and travel expenses."'3 '
Code provisions attempt to address the resulting potential for bias and par-
tiality in two ways. First, they prohibit any conduct that gives rise to an appear-
ance of impropriety or partiality.' Second, they require a judge to disqualify
herself if "[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer."'33 These standards, which require a subjective determination of
the appearance or actuality of bias by the judge, are not an effective antidote to
an excess of informal interactions between lawyers and judges. In addition to
being lenient,3 4 they are plagued by the interpretive problems just discussed. A
judge's understanding of when the appearance or actuality of personal bias is
present is likely to be driven by a normative community that accepts and values
close and frequent informal interactions between judges and lawyers. For the
129. ABA, supra note 102, at 302; see also Cal. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Advisory Op.
43 (1994) (explaining the term by reference to the type of social event or gift that is
"common among people in the judge's community"); Okla. Judicial Ethics Advi-
sory Panel, Advisory Op. 2001-03 (2001) (same).
130. Defenders of the model codes might answer some of these concerns by reference
to catch-all code provisions that prohibit appearances of impropriety. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 2A cmt. (1990). But these provisions have little effect in deterring
behavior that is not clearly proscribed by more specific code provisions. Accor-
dingly, the drafters considered adding "a comment to the effect that ordinarily,
when judges are disciplined for violating their duty to avoid the appearance of
impropriety, it is in combination with other, more specific rule violations that
give rise to the appearance problem." 2007 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION, supra note
86, at 7; see also Harrison, supra note 18, at 262 (discussing the sentiment that an
appearances standard is too vague for independent enforcement).
131. Heller, supra note 5, at A2 (describing "thousands of dollars in gifts, rounds of
golf, and travel expenses" that were received by a justice from law firms that regu-
larly appeared before him).
132. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
133. Id. R. 2.1(A)(1).
134. In comparison, conflicts arising from a financial interest in or a particular rela-
tionship with a party require automatic disqualification. Id. R. 2.11(A)(2)-(6).
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same reasons, there is a real risk that courts will be too lenient in reviewing a
judge's refusal to disqualify herself"I
The problematic influence of bar norms in shaping judicial conduct is
compounded in two additional ways: by a lack of transparent prospective guid-
ance and by deep-seated dependencies between many state judges and their
states' practicing bars. Complaints and resulting disciplinary proceedings are
kept confidential at least until a judicial conduct commission brings formal
charges of misconduct against a judge."' In many states, they are kept confiden-
tial until and unless sanctions are imposed.137 This means that judges seeking to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the codes, and anyone trying to
evaluate a judge's conduct as against the codes, have limited information
regarding the line between permissible and impermissible conduct. In some
states, the problem is mitigated by advisory opinions construing particular code
provisions.13'8 But these advisory opinions, which carry questionable persuasive
force, do not resolve all ambiguity, nor are they available in all states.39
The problem is further compounded by dependencies between many state
judges and the practicing bar, which create incentives for state court judges to
embrace rather than resist close ties with the profession. In states that utilize
judicial elections for selection or retention, judges depend for their jobs on their
states' practicing legal communities, which participate heavily in fundraising,
campaigning, and voting for judicial candidates.14o Ideally, elections could func-
tion to hold judges accountable for their conduct and misconduct. But whether
due to lack of interest by voters or lack of transparent information regarding
individual judges, judicial conduct and misconduct appear to play little role in
election results.141 More often than not, the electorate's voting patterns appear
135. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT
AND ETHICS § 4.16, at 140 (3d ed. 2000); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 460-61
(discussing the problems associated with using recusal and disqualification as re-
medies for parties who question a judge's impartiality).
136. SHAMAN, LUBET & ALFINI, supra note 135, § 13-15, at 469-70.
137. All fifty states keep judicial disciplinary proceedings confidential, at least until a
judicial conduct commission brings formal charges. Id. § 13-15, at 470. Twenty-two
states make proceedings public once a commission, after a finding of probable
cause, files formal charges; nineteen states make proceedings public once a com-
mission makes a recommendation of discipline to the state supreme court; and
nine states and the District of Columbia make proceedings public only when a
supreme court orders a sanction. Id.
138. Id. § 1.1, at 22-25.
139. Id.
140. See Swisher, supra note 16; Williams & Ditslear, supra note 16, at 136.
141. See Daniel Burke, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c): Toward the Proper
Regulation of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 181, 205-07




to mirror prevailing political preferences.14 ' This only reinforces judges' reliance
on campaign support from lawyers and bar groups. Notwithstanding the strong
political agendas that may lie behind lawyers' rhetoric of procedural fairness
and technical competence, judges are drawn to the promise of nonpolitical
support from lawyers and bar groups.
Dependencies on the practicing bar are strong even in states with appointed
judiciaries. Bar associations often play key roles in recommending individuals
for office.143 And in states where judicial terms are limited, or where judges fre-
quently opt to retire or are voted out of office, judges rely on the practicing bar
for future career opportunities.'" Judges in all states, therefore, have reason to
value ties with the profession. The effect is to further empower bar norms to
inform definitions of appropriate judicial conduct, but where bar norms rather
than independent judicial norms condition the behavior of judges, judicial
independence and legitimacy suffer.
B. The Threat to the Profession
Even though the profession advanced its own private interests through the
process of judicial conduct reform, its institutional position has suffered along
with that of the judiciary. Increasingly close ties with state courts have dam-
pened professional independence and threatened professional legitimacy. This,
in turn, has weakened the profession's justifications for the privileges of
self-governance and monopoly.
Professional independence entails autonomy along two different but related
axes: autonomy from clients and autonomy from the state.145 Autonomy from
clients allows lawyers to exercise some degree of independent moral judgment
in balancing their often-conflicting duties to clients, courts, and the public
interest.14'6 Autonomy from the state, achieved through self-regulation as well as
Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected
Judges, 1o6 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (2003).
142. See, e.g., Editorial, A Blow to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at A34 (report-
ing the defeat in a retention election of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices who
had ruled in favor of same-sex marriage).
143. Johnstone, supra note 19, at 226.
144. See Christopher R. McFadden, Judicial Independence, Age-Based BFOQS, and the
Perils of Mandatory Retirement Policies for Appointed State Judges, 52 S.C. L. REV.
81, 128-31 (2000); William Glaberson, Judges Quitting at Unusual Rate as Salaries
Lag, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 2011, at Al.
145. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1988).
146. See, e.g., Aziz Rana, Statesman or Scribe? Legal Independence and the Problem of
Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665, 1667-68 (2009). Scholars disag-
ree as to the desired extent of independence from clients and client demands, but
some degree of independence is considered necessary to ensure that lawyers do
not facilitate client wrongdoing. See Gordon, supra note 145, at 11-12 (noting a lack
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economic independence,'47 empowers the legal profession to serve as a protec-
tor of individual rights and as an intermediary between society and the state.148
Explaining the value of this type of independence,'4 the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct state: "An independent legal profession is an important
force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on gov-
ernment for the right to practice."' 0 It is this second form of professional inde-
pendence-autonomy from the state-that has been primarily implicated and
threatened by the process of judicial conduct reform.
As a practical matter, this form of independence permits the profession
to mobilize politically in opposition to the state when it believes the state is
overreaching and threatening the values of political liberalism.' The ABA itself
has done so on several occasions, including in response to the rise of the regula-
tory state during the New Deal (a position from which it subsequently
retreated) and in response to President Roosevelt's court-packing plan."' More
recently, the ABA has opposed the death penalty on the grounds that its admin-
istration is inconsistent with constitutional norms' and supported the rights of
gays and lesbians to marry.5 4 The profession also played a crucial role in identi-
fying and addressing perceived rights violations at Guantinamo.15
of consensus regarding the extent to which lawyers should exercise independent
moral judgment in representing clients).
147. See Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining that Venezuelan and
Egyptian examples demonstrate how the private market reduces dependency on
the state and ensures financing that allows for successful political mobilization).
148. See Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1281-82 (2003); Gordon, supra note 145, at io-11; Peter Margulies, Lawyers'
Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Corporate Misconduct,
Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 944-45 (20o6).
149. This type of professional independence is believed to be central to a liberal
democracy. See Margulies, supra note 148, at 944; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Good
that Lawyers Do, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 7, 13 (2000).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., at io (1983).
151. See Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 34.
152. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 195, 221-24 (1976).
153. SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 22, at 46-47.
154. Edward A. Adams, ABA Backs Marriage Equality for Gays and Lesbians, A.B.A. J.
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ababacks-marriage
equality-for-gays-andlesbians/.
155. David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981
(2008). Lawyers have addressed these perceived violations not only by providing
pro bono legal counsel to detainees notwithstanding government pressure to




When the ABA discusses professional independence from the state, it gen-
erally addresses independence from the political branches of government."'
Independence from the judiciary, however, does not appear to be either neces-
sary or desirable in the bar's view. Thus, the ABA's Model Rules take the posi-
tion that close ties or even unity between bench and bar-which entails a cor-
responding lack of professional independence from the courts-is what ensures
professional independence from the state. The Preamble states that regulation
of the profession by the courts protects the "independence of the profession and
the public interest which it serves.""' But this explanation of the desirability of
close bench-bar ties is only relevant to the influence of the judiciary over the
profession-the regulator over the regulated. Influence of the profession over
the judiciary-the regulated over the regulator-implicates an entirely different
set of concerns. In that context of judicial conduct regulation, appearances of
excessive closeness between judges and lawyers can raise doubts as to courts'
efficacy in regulating the practice of law. Such appearances lend credence to the
theory that the profession has moved closer to capturing its primary regulator,
particularly when combined with two additional factors: state judiciaries' dele-
gation of most aspects of attorney conduct regulation back to the bar and
judges' general reluctance to sanction instances of lawyer misconduct in
court."' These appearances trigger increased calls for outside regulation, which
represents a direct threat to professional independence.1 9
Specific provisions of the ABA's judicial conduct codes-namely, the
preferential access provisions-are also problematic for the institutional legiti-
macy and independence of the profession. Much as they do for judges, these
against government policies with which they have disagreed. It was, of course,
government lawyers who validated and defended these policies in the first place.
But the question of the proper kind and extent of professional independence of
government lawyers is distinct from that of the independence of the profession at
large. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the
Attorney General, 6o STAN. L. REV. 1931 (20o8). For more examples of lawyers
opposing the state, see Robin D. Barnes, Natural Legal Guardians of Judicial Inde-
pendence and Academic Freedom, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1456 (2009).
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., at io-ii (1983).
157. Id. at ii.
158. Barton, Institutional Analysis, supra note 17, at 1168. See generally Lawrence W.
Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the "Captured" Regulators
of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457 (2002) (arguing that the
defendant-favorable characteristics of the tort of legal malpractice evidence the
bar's capture of the judiciary).
159. See Barton, Institutional Analysis, supra note 17, at n168; see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
641, 657 (20o6) ("Over the last quarter century, the deficiencies in self-regulation
have attracted growing attention. Legislators, administrative agencies, federal
courts, and malpractice insurance companies have come to play an increasing role
in professional governance.").
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provisions give rise to problematic appearances, if not realities. For example,
provisions that allow lawyers to extend social invitations and gifts to judges and
to reimburse judges' costs in attending trips and seminars signal that savvy
lawyers can and do curry favor with judges. For many litigants, this appearance
may reinforce the notion that winning in court is a matter of retaining the right
lawyer, not of having a meritorious claim. For criminal defendants, it may offer
another reason to distrust lawyers. Defendants may interpret close and com-
fortable interactions between a judge and defense counsel-particularly
court-appointed defense counsel-as evidence that counsel's loyalty lies with
the judge and with the court system, rather than with the defendant."'o
Broadening from the effects on individual litigants to those on society at
large, perceptions that lawyers exert special influence over judges may exacer-
bate existing mistrust of lawyers. Some commentators have attributed this
mistrust to an understanding of the profession as an antidemocratic force in
society. Professor Rana recently explained that, "[w]hile all citizens are sup-
posed to have an equal voice in controlling public policy, lawyers seemingly
embody a separate caste, able to manipulate elected representatives and assert
undue pressure on political life."'"' Offering support for this theory, a 2002 ABA
study concluded that declining public perceptions of the profession are tied to
discomfort "with the connections that lawyers have with politics, the judiciary,
government, big business, and law enforcement,162 as well as to fears that these
connections allow lawyers "not only to play the system, but also to shape that
very system." 6 3 The bar's success in drafting and securing adoption of the prefe-
rential access provisions could be viewed as a vivid and troubling illustration of
the bar using its connections to shape the legal system to its own advantage.
Through the reform process, the bar undoubtedly increased its own power
at the expense of judicial power. But the resulting integration of interests
proved problematic for both institutions. It weakened the checks that more
independent judiciaries and a more independent profession could exercise over
each other. And it lessened the ability of each to mobilize in the face
of threats to political liberalism. The bar's role in judicial conduct reform
16o. See Michael C. Krikava & Charlann E. Winking, The Right of an Indigent Criminal
Defendant To Proceed Pro Se on Appeal: By Statute or Constitution, a Necessary
Evil, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 103, 19 n.76 (1989) (noting instances of mistrust of
public defenders by criminal defendants).
161. Rana, supra note 146, at 1665; see also WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS:
HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW 313-14
(2003) (arguing that while the democratic process is flawed, the right of
self-governance should not be turned over to a new ruling class of unaccountable
lawyers).
162. Leo J. Shapiro & Assocs., Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research Find-





therefore harmed its own institutional position along with the positions of state
judiciaries.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: MOVING TOWARD COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
In this concluding Part, I offer preliminary suggestions for reform, address-
ing both the ABA's drafting of the Model Codes and states' adoption of them. I
begin by describing characteristics of an ideal bench-bar relationship, in which
close ties allow judges and lawyers to cooperate, collaborate, and together
mobilize in furtherance of political liberalism. I then examine the challenges of
broad-based reform and offer a series of predicate steps that may address these
challenges in order to enable reform. I suggest a flexible model of collaborative
governance, which will bring existing relationships into closer alignment with
the ideal, and I close by proposing specific reforms to the codes of conduct,
aimed at reshaping the profession's relationships with state judiciaries.
A. An Ideal Model
That the bar's role in judicial conduct regulation gave rise to problematical-
ly tight relationships, which opened the door to interested outcomes, does not
mean that close ties are never desirable. Nor does it suggest that lawyers should
not participate in judicial conduct regulation. Designed appropriately, close ties
play a central role in an ideal model of the bench-bar relationship. They allow
the profession and judiciaries to participate in a natural and desirable commu-
nity of interests."4 They enable judges and lawyers to work together in the liti-
gation process and the administration of justice, and in promoting the values of
political liberalism.
The most fundamental tie between our country's judiciaries and the legal
profession, which an ideal model will necessarily accept, is the shared training
of judges and lawyers. Most judges, and virtually all judges of federal and state
constitutional courts, were trained as lawyers.16 5 As a result, lawyers and judges
share a legal education and similar professional experiences. Judges are often
drawn from among the bar's most competent and respected members,"' and,
following their judicial tenure, often rejoin the practicing bar either in govern-
ment positions or private practice.
Shared legal training ensures that judges and lawyers have the necessary
expertise to understand, shape, and apply doctrines of procedural and substan-
tive law. This training also prepares them to work together effectively through
the litigation process. Lawyers support the work of judges by, among other
things, bringing claims and disputes before the courts while filtering out base-
164. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1709 (2004).
165. PROVINE, supra note 38, at i.
166. Barton, Institutional Analysis, supra note 17, at 1197.
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less or clearly frivolous claims, developing their arguments through discovery
and research, and advancing their positions through briefing and oral advoca-
cy.67 Judges, for their part, provide leadership and guidance in matters of subs-
tantive law and procedure.
Common training and experience creates the potential for judges and
lawyers to work together in promoting competent and ethical conduct. Judges
bring to the regulation of attorney conduct an understanding of the realities of
legal practice. They can also serve as a valuable check on lawyer self-interest.168
Lawyers bring to the regulation of judicial conduct understanding of the critical
importance of decisional and institutional independence, as well as sensitivity
to the ever-changing realities of legal practice. They can also check
self-interested judicial behavior and promote public accountability through
mechanisms such as judicial performance evaluations."9 The involvement of
lawyers in the regulation of the bench, and courts in the regulation of the bar,
can therefore increase public confidence in both institutions, which in turn
promotes their legitimacy and independence.
Ideally, judges' and lawyers' shared expertise and training, and shared
commitment to high ethical and competency standards, would allow bench-bar
cooperation to move beyond the litigation process and to facilitate the devel-
opment of the law and the legal system more broadly. As Professors Halliday,
Karpik, and Feeley have theorized, close bench-bar ties confer political efficacy,
which judges and lawyers can use to promote political liberalism in a number of
ways.17 o Judges and lawyers frequently and fruitfully collaborate on initiatives to
increase access to justice and to improve the efficiency of the courts.17 ' Lawyers
advance claims, and courts provide forums, to establish and protect core proce-
dural rights and political freedoms. 17 ' Lawyers advocate for the independence of
judiciaries, and independent judiciaries can then moderate state power and
check overreaching by the political branches.'73 By protecting political freedoms
and limiting state power, lawyers and judges together facilitate and encourage
167. Id. at 1191.
168. Judges can ensure that admissions standards and the rules governing practice pri-
oritize the public's interests over the profession's interests. They can also ensure
that individual lawyers accept and balance their roles as officers of the court with
their roles and duties as representatives of clients. See Edson R. Sunderland, The
English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725, 745 (1926) (explain-
ing that the organized bar is "unable to look at procedural problems with the
detachment the public interest demands").
169. See Geyh, Paradise Lost, supra note in, at 1212-19.







an engaged civil society, which holds all branches of government accountable.'7
Fulfilling their separate roles but working together in these ways, the profession
and the judiciary would ideally rely on close ties to bolster the legitimacy and
independence of both institutions, thereby promoting the values of political
liberalism.
B. Predicates to Reform
Before proposing reforms to foster this ideal relationship, some important
caveats and preliminary steps are in order. I have focused largely on problems
created by bar interests centralized through the ABA, but a number of other
variables, such as state governance structures and politics, also promote and
constrain the regulation of bench-bar relationships. The degree to which gover-
nance of state judiciaries is constitutionally or customarily left to the judiciaries
themselves varies widely from state to state.1'7 In some states, governance has
long been shared between judiciaries and the coordinate branches of govern-
ment, but in others, judiciaries have had almost exclusive autonomy in struc-
turing their own governance. All states have unique political and professional
resources'76 and cultures'" that bear on bench-bar relationships. Accordingly,
any model for reform needs to be general and flexible enough to accommodate
a wide degree of state variation.
In addition to the difficulties presented by diverse legal systems, barriers to
reform may be posed by the balance of power between bench and bar in many
states. The state and territorial judiciaries comprise a panoply of distinct institu-
tions, with little unity and significant turnover.'18 With reference to the creation
174. Id.
175. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point on a High Court: Some
Thoughts on the Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen and the
Limits of Judicial Self-Regulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1051-54 (1995); Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1871-75 (2001).
176. See Hershkoff, supra note 175, at 1891-92 (describing the relative lack of legislative
resources at the state level as compared to the federal level).
177. New York provides an example of a state where bench and bar have made notable
efforts to preclude problematic lawyer influence on judicial decision making. See,
e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Unif. Court Sys., Stringent Assignment Rule Aims
To Protect Judicial Neutrality (June 28, 2011), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
press/pr2onLo3.shtml (announcing a new rule requiring recusal in any case where
any lawyer or party contributed $2500 or more to the judge's campaign in the pre-
ceding two years).
178. In addition to the state courts and District of Columbia courts, territorial courts
exist in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Independent State of
Samoa.
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of model codes, they are at a distinct disadvantage when facing the ABA, which
unifies and coordinates state bar associations and acts as an authoritative voice
of the profession.179 Moreover, the majority of state judges depend on the sup-
port and favor of the practicing legal community for their careers-both for
retaining their judicial office and for opportunities following their judicial
tenure.so As a result, many state court judges lack incentives to temper the
ABA's influence. They may be inclined to foster rather than to weaken ties with
the bar. And the ties themselves are reinforcing. To the extent that they foster a
normative community of lawyers and judges that values close relationships
between bench and bar, state court judges are less likely to think that it is neces-
sary to reform those relationships.
Given these realities, state judiciaries may need to recapture a certain
amount of power in relation to the profession if reform is to be possible. To this
end, reform efforts should pursue three preliminary lines of change. The first
would address the structure of judicial service. Through election reform'"'
and increased judicial pay,' state court judges could be relieved of their
dependence on the practicing bar for judicial office and subsequent career
179. See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 22, at 26, 33; Burbank, supra note 164, at
1709-10.
180. In states with elected judiciaries, judges frequently rely on lawyers for campaign
donations and votes. In states with merit selection plans, judges frequently rely on
endorsements from state and local bar associations. See Barton, Institutional Anal-
ysis, supra note 17, at 1198-99.
181. New York is at the forefront of these efforts with a new rule, effective July 2011,
which requires a judge to recuse herself in any case where a lawyer or party con-
tributed $2500 or more to the judge's campaign in the preceding two years. See
supra note 177. Although the ABA appears to support such a rule following the
Supreme Court's decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009), it has done little to facilitate actual change. See ABA STANDING COMM. OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES Resolution 107
(2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/files/Resolutionlo7.pdf.
182. The ABA and other bar groups have played a vocal role in advocating for in-
creased judicial pay. See ABA, Statement of the American Bar Association on Feder-
al Judicial Compensation (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/poladv/letters/judiciary/2007apr9 judpayhjt.authcheckdam.pdf (sub-
mitted for the Hearing Record of the Subcommittee on the Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary); Debra Cas-
sens Weiss, ABA Urges Supreme Court To Accept Case on Lack of Judicial Pay Rais-
es, A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba-urges
supreme-courtto-acceptcase on lack_of-judicial-payraises/. Increased ju-
dicial pay would certainly ameliorate the dependency of many state judges on the
practicing bar, but the ABA's efforts are not necessarily desirable. They have not
been effective and are frequently dismissed as self-serving. Moreover, by empha-
sizing pay comparators from private practice rather than government, they
underline and support the profession's position that judiciaries are a part of the




opportunities. These steps are long-term and require significant political en-
gagement and funding. Important work in these areas is ongoing."'
A second predicate line of change would seek to establish a countervailing
normative community among state judges, capable of checking ABA influence.
Many state judiciaries undoubtedly possess distinct and laudable professional
judicial cultures. Taking steps to promote these communities-and to connect
the many communities of judges across jurisdictions-could act as a powerful
check on bar norms. It would also promote the effective administration of jus-
tice across jurisdictions by fostering communication among diverse judiciaries
and court systems. If centrally coordinated, state judiciaries could effectively
work to develop their own identity, norms, and sense of judicial professional-
ism,. set apart and distinct from those of the practicing bar. Such organizations
could also foster important interchanges among judiciaries to share knowledge
and experiences of court management and judging, taking advantage of the fact
that although our diverse legal systems create challenges to reform, they also of-
fer opportunities for experimentation.114 As examples, the Conference of Chief
Justices,'81 the National Judicial College,186 and the National Center for State
183. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been heavily involved in reform initiatives since
retiring. See, e.g., Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., O'Connor Judi-
cial Selection Initiative, U. DENVER, http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/judicial
selection.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the
State of the Judiciary, Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary,
GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary (last visited Oct.
20, 2011). She has also made numerous speeches and been involved in numerous
studies supporting these initiatives and proposing specific courses of reform. See,
e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Earl F. Nelson Lecture at the University of Missouri
School of Law Symposium: The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan
(Feb. 27, 2009), in 74 Mo. L. REV. 479 (2009); ABA, JUSTICE IS THE BUSINESS OF
THE GOVERNMENT: REPORT OF THE 2009 SUMMIT ON THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL STATE COURTS (2009), available at http://www.lwv.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Projects/Judiciallndependence/Miscellaneous/summitreport.pdf.
184. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 398-99 (2004); Sunderland,
supra note 168, at 744.
185. The Conference of Chief Justices was established in 1949 to "provide an opportu-
nity for the highest judicial officers of the states to meet and discuss matters of
importance in improving the administration of justice, rules and methods of pro-
cedure, and the organization and operation of state courts and judicial systems,"
and to "make recommendations and bring about improvements on such mat-
ters." About CCJ, CONF. CHIEF JUSTICES, http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/about.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
186. See Robert Payant, Ethical Training in the Profession: The Special Challenge of the
Judiciary, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 313-15 (1995) (describing the establish-
ment and purposes of the National Judicial College).
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Courts"' could expand their programs and activities to promote socialization
and mutual support among the state judiciaries and to play a meaningful role in
conduct regulation. Efforts along these lines are already bearing fruit."' Aca-
demic centers, such as the Dwight D. Opperman Institute of Judicial Adminis-
tration at New York University School of Law' 9 and the Duke Law Center for
Judicial Studies,'9 o could play a similar role in facilitating exchanges and foster-
ing distinct judicial cultures. 9'
A third and final predicate step would be to require the profession to take
greater responsibility in prioritizing its civic responsibilities over its private
interests. The profession should recognize the obligations conferred by its
monopoly status and take the position that it, like its lawyers, has a "special
responsibility for the quality of justice."'92 This position should manifest itself in
a number of ways. The profession should advocate a more detached and profes-
sional stance on judicial conduct regulation. The ABA should step away from
rhetoric painting judiciaries as a part of the profession and should instead pro-
mote a discourse and reality of the profession dedicated to service of judiciaries,
clients, and the public at large. The ABA should recognize that including judi-
cial identity and culture in its regulation activities, as distinct from bar identity
and culture, is necessary to restore legitimacy to the process.
187. The National Center for State Courts was established in 1971 to encourage state
court collaboration to further efficiency in court administration. See NAT'L
CENTER ST. COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
188. In a 2007 resolution, the Conference of Chief Justices opposed the ABA's proposal
to eliminate from the Model Code the requirement that judges avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety as an enforceable standard. James Podgers, Judging Judicial
Behavior, 93 A.B.A. J. 61 (2007). The Conference's efforts were ultimately success-
ful in persuading the ABA to retain the enforceable standard. See id.
189. Dwight D. Opperman Inst. ofJudicial Admin., NYU LAW, http://www.law.nyu.edul
centers/judiciallindex.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). The Institute hosts an an-
nual lecture series addressing state judiciaries and, last summer, hosted a confe-
rence titled "Florence Conference: Judicial Cooperation Among State Courts in
Europe and the U.S.: A Comparative Approach." Id.; see also Florence Conference:
Judicial Cooperation Among State Courts in Europe and the U.S., NYU LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/judicial/programs/florenceconference/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
190. Duke Law Ctr. for Judicial Studies, DUKE LAW, http://www.law.duke.edu/
judicialstudies/index (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
191. Cf Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 8-9 (discussing the role of the legal
academy as an "integral component[] in the modern legal complex").
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).
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C. Theoretical Contours of Reform
If the core obstacles to reform are addressed through these predicate steps,
the process of judicial conduct regulation could be structured to harness the
synergies between bench and bar while checking the possibility of interested
outcomes. With this as a goal, I propose voluntary reforms to move the process
of code revision and enactment toward a model of collaborative governance.
Collaborative governance is directed toward building consensus among
stakeholders to balance competing public and private interests through a
process of engaged negotiation.'93 Both at the ABA level and the state level, this
type of deliberative problem-solving approach 94 could provide a flexible model,
adaptable to the needs of different states. It will require reforms guided by the
four principles of voluntariness, broad-based stakeholder participation, prob-
lem-solving engagement, and transparency.
1. Voluntariness
A proposal for voluntary reform may initially appear unrealistic, but it will
become far more realistic as lawyers and judges recognize that the likely alterna-
tive is a forced reorientation of the relationship through increased external reg-
ulation.195 Increased external regulation of one or both institutions may be ad-
vantageous in decreasing problematic appearances and better aligning
professional interests with public interests'9-certainly, the specter of external
regulation plays an important role in maintaining checks and balances on insti-
193. See generally Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1982-1983) (proposing this approach to administrative rulemaking).
194. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 377-78.
195. See Barton, Institutional Analysis, supra note 17, at n68 (arguing against courts as
the appropriate regulator of the legal profession); Martha Neil, loo Law Profs Lob-
by Congress To Apply Ethics Code to US Supreme Court Justices, A.B.A. J., Feb. 23,
20n, available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ioo_aw-profs-lobby
congress-to-apply-ethics codetous-supremecourt-justil (asking Congress
to apply an ethics code to U.S. Supreme Court Justices); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judi-
cial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for
the Courts, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 301, 325 (2010) (arguing for outside regulation of
the judiciary through the creation of an inspector general position).
196. The profession is already subject to certain forms of outside regulation. For
example, administrative agencies promulgate and enforce rules governing lawyers
who practice before them, and private parties can hold lawyers liable for profes-
sional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth
of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2009) (arguing that "[I]aw in the
United States is a heavily regulated industry"). But on the whole, as compared to
other systems, the American legal profession retains a high degree of autonomy.
See BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS, supra note 17, at 131-32.
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tutional power.' 97 But actualized and extensive external regulation could also
infringe upon the independence of one or both institutions and diminish their
ability to mobilize in furtherance of political liberalism, particularly in future
moments of crisis. 8 In light of the uncertain implications of increased external
regulation, the profession and judiciaries should preempt a forced reorientation
through voluntary reform, which could also help restore public trust and confi-
dence in both bench and bar.'9 9 Both institutions should recognize that reforms
need not advantage one at the expense of the other.2 0 0 A reshaped relationship
could be mutually beneficial, increasing the legitimacy and independence of
both institutions.2 1
2. Stakeholder Participation
Through a process of consensus building, the collaborative governance
model harnesses the benefits that diverse interests may bring to the negotiation
table.20 2 It acknowledges the frequent intertwinement between public and
private interests, of which the bar's dual orientations toward public and private
interests is a salient example.2 o3 In order for the model to work properly,
however, interested stakeholders must play an active role in the negotiation
process. 20 4
In the context of judicial conduct regulation, the stakeholders include judi-
ciaries, the practicing bar, other private interest groups, and legislatures. As
demonstrated, the bar has already taken an active role, but the role for judicial
197. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 647
(2000).
198. See Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, supra note 8, at 34; supra notes 159-161 and accom-
panying text.
199. Lobel, supra note 184, at 395.
200. See id. at 458; see also Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel:
Liberal Politics, Economic Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in FIGHTING FOR POLITI-
CAL FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 247, 264-67 (describing how, in Israel, even despite
a relationship occasionally marked by opposition, bench and bar successfully in-
creased the prestige of both institutions).
201. Notably, continued involvement of the bar in the reform process need not entirely
preempt other forms of governance. Substantive statutory and case law beyond
the conduct codes, such as criminal law, would continue to apply to the conduct
of both judges and lawyers.
202. Lobel, supra note 184, at 380; Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on
Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411,
421-22 (2000).
203. Freeman, supra note 197, at 547-48; Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The Future of
Governance, 2009 J. DisP. REsOL. 411, 412 (2009); Lobel, supra note 184, at 374.




input in the standard-setting process should be expanded. This could be facili-
tated through ABA cooperation with state judicial organizationso' and other
judicial groups.20 The ABA should also seek participation by a wide variety of
individual judges from as many different federal and state courts as possible.
These judges should be encouraged to scrutinize bar positions on appropriate
conduct standards and to resist those that would cast a pall on judicial legitima-
cy or that would undermine judicial independence.
Although membership in the ABA or other bar organizations could create
an appearance of improper influence,2 o7 judicial membership and leadership in
such voluntary organizations alone need not be problematic if judges make
clear that their role is to direct and engage with, rather than to be directed by,
the profession. This is especially so if judges focus their participation and
leadership on matters directly relevant to courts and judiciaries. Alternatively,
bar associations could allow judges to participate in judicial and court reform
efforts without requiring or actively seeking their membership. In all cases, the
ABA and other associations must make the rhetorical concession to stop
touting judge membership as a means of increasing their own organizational
legitimacy.'20
Judiciary and bar involvement in the revision of the Model Codes and in
their enactment in the states, while critical, is insufficient. The involvement of
public interest groups concerned with judicial administration is necessary in
order to create adequate checks on interested outcomes.2 0 In soliciting com-
ments and suggestions on draft revisions, the ABA has taken important steps in
this regard.21 o Through greater publicity and targeted efforts, it should solicit
feedback from a wider range of public interest groups. It should also give pub-
lic, reasoned responses to all submitted comments.
205. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 395; see also, e.g., About State Chapters, AM. JUDICA-
TURE Soc'Y, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/statechapter/ajs-aboutsc.asp (last visited Oct.
27, 2011); About CJA, CAL. JUDGES Ass'N, http://www.caljudges.orglabout-cja.vp
.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); CSJA Mission Statement, CENT. STATES JUDGES
Ass'N, http://www.csja.net (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); COUNTY JUDGES & COMMIS-
SIONERS AsS'N TEX., http://www.cjcat.org/assoc/cms (last visited Oct. 27, 2011);
Ky. COUNTY JUDGE/EXECUTIVE Ass'N, http://www.kcjea.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2011); MICH. DISTRICT JUDGES Ass'N, http://www.mdja.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2011); WASH. ST. DISTRICT & MUN. CT. JUDGES Ass'N, http://dmcja.org (last vi-
sited Oct. 27, 2011).
206. See supra notes 185-188 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 126.
208. Womble, Hazard & Moser, supra note 126, at o.
209. See Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 421-22 (noting that public interest group
involvement is an important check on collusion).
210. Cynthia Gray, The 2007 ABA Model Code: Taking Judicial Ethics Standards to the
Next Level, 90 JUDICATURE 284, 284 (2007).
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The participation of legislative interests is also desirable. Encouraging this
involvement would be a logical and relatively straightforward step in states in
which legislatures already play a role in judicial administration. It would be
equally desirable in states in which the legislature's role is limited. By involving
legislatures as stakeiolders in the process, the legitimacy of reform could be
strengthened and the likelihood of involuntary regulation lessened."'
3. Problem-Solving Engagement
A collaborative governance approach would allow participating stakehold-
ers to advocate their interests rather than obscuring them.m' Judicial and bar
interests would sometimes diverge, and, where they did, both institutions
would need to faithfully represent their own interests while challenging and
checking those of the other.2" The conflict that would sometimes result would
be a necessary aspect of healthy engagement, and it would signal that the com-
promises required by close institutional relationships were not being produced
in informal and private settings, where the aligned self-interest of bench and bar
could take precedence over the public's interest. Rather, negotiated compro-
mises would represent the result of healthy, vigorous, and public opposition be-
tween the interests and orientations of bench and bar. 14
Sometimes, this could lead to public conflict, but it need not lead to open
hostility or interfere with agreeable and productive working relationships. Law-
yers and judges share training in advocacy, which prepares them to engage in an
adversarial process while maintaining a high level of collegiality in their work-
ing relationships. And the collaborative governance process itself often leads
parties to work with, instead of against, one another.'
4. Transparency
Reforms should also require increased transparency in bench-bar relation-
ships. If this transparency reveals fair dealing and desirable bench-bar coopera-
tion, it would promote public trust and confidence."' Even if the transparency
211. See Freeman, supra note 197, at 647, 665.
212. Harter, supra note 203, at 420-21; Lobel, supra note 184, at 453.
213. For example, Barzilai describes bar criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court, which
ultimately was resolved by the creation of an Office of the Ombudsman within the
judiciary to deal with public complaints and improve judicial accountability. See
Barzilai, supra note 200, at 266.
214. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 380.
215. See id. at 379.
216. See Miller, supra note 4, at 468 (observing that secrecy in judicial discipline pro-





reveals actual or apparent impropriety, it would still have a desirable effect 17 by
increasing pressure on judges and lawyers to reform their conduct and to think
carefully about the appearances to which their interactions might give rise. In
all cases, it would facilitate informed public discussion"' and participation in
the standard- setting and conduct regulation processes. 9
Electronic media provide powerful tools for increasing transparency, but
publication alone is not enough. Especially in a technical area such as
procedural law, it is important that information be sorted, stripped of jargon,
and presented in a readily intelligible way. The goal must be not only to disse-
minate relevant information, but also to do so in a manner that is readily
accessible and easily digestible by non-experts."o
In holding public hearings during the revisions process and posting draft
revisions and submitted comments on its website,"' the ABA has made impor-
tant efforts in this regard, but additional efforts are necessary. For example,
both the ABA and state review committees should make all meeting minutes
publicly available and easily accessible. This would prompt increased public
interest and input in judicial conduct regulation, while also acting as an inde-
pendent check on interested outcomes.2
Increased transparency should extend beyond the promulgation of the
codes to their implementation and enforcement. In many states, complaints
and resulting disciplinary proceedings remain permanently confidential unless
and until formal discipline is recommended or imposed.2 As a result, previous
217. Cf. ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT 33 (1992) (concluding that a desire to protect lawyers' reputations did
not justify confidential disciplinary hearings, which contributed to public distrust
of lawyer discipline, and that they should therefore be opened to public view).
218. See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924,
927-28 (2oo9) (discussing the instrumental value of transparency in government
processes in facilitating meaningful public participation).
219. The ABA revision process leading up to the 2007 Model Code entailed public
hearings at which the drafting committee heard testimony and received com-
ments, but participation was almost exclusively by lawyers, judges, and
law-related organizations. Harrison, supra note 18, at 258. Increased transparency
would increase the likelihood of broader public participation.
220. See Lobel, supra note 184, at 455-56.
221. Gray, supra note 210, at 284.
222. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-
MENT (1996) (discussing the value of transparency and openness in deliberative
democracy).
223. All fifty states keep judicial disciplinary proceedings confidential, at least until a
judicial conduct commission brings formal charges. Twenty-two states make pro-
ceedings public once a commission, after a finding of probable cause, files formal
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cases rarely offer guidance regarding the line between appropriate and inappro-
priate interactions and behaviors. To remedy this, state judicial conduct com-
missions should make public all complaints and their disposition. Where possi-
ble, they should offer sufficiently detailed explanations to provide information
and guidance for other judges. States should also increase the availability of
prospective guidance. States that do not currently issue advisory opinions
should begin to do so,22 4 and all states should consider more detailed code
commentaries that illustrate and distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible behaviors and interactions.
Finally, states should track and make data available regarding the disposi-
tion of complaints. Some states currently track complaints, but many do not."'
Those that do track complaints appear to record only limited data regarding
numbers of complaints filed and pursued; they offer little information regard-
ing complaints that are summarily dismissed, which represent the vast majority
of complaints."' Transparent and meaningful data would provide important
information regarding problematic behaviors and flawed enforcement mechan-
isms, which could in turn lead to useful recommendations for reform.
D. Proposed Code Revisions
I have proposed that a voluntary reorientation of bench-bar relationships
toward a model of collaborative governance would preserve and promote judi-
cial and professional legitimacy and independence. Specific reforms to the pre-
ferential access provisions themselves-particularly to those of the ABA model
codes, used as a template in many states-can aid in the creation of these rela-
tionships. Regarding some issues, such as participation in fundraising activities,
the revised provisions should treat law-related and non-law-related individuals
and organizations equally. Regarding other issues, such as receipt of gifts and
social hospitality, the revised provisions should hold lawyers and law-related
organizations to a higher standard than other members of the public.
Starting with the former category, the ABA model codes and state-enacted
codes should prohibit judges from soliciting funds and from directly participat-
ing in fundraising activities for all types of organizations . 7 Regardless of the
charges; nineteen states make proceedings public once a commission makes a rec-
ommendation of discipline to the state supreme court; and nine states and the
District of Columbia make proceedings public only when a supreme court orders
a sanction. See SHAMAN, LUBET & ALFINI, supra note 135, § 13.15, at 470.
224. Thirty-four states issue advisory opinions. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, § 1.12.
225. See Conduct Organizations Share Complaint and Budget Data, 20 JUD. CONDUCT
REP. 1 (1999); Discipline-State Court Judges, CITIZENS JUD. ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.judicialaccountability.org/judicialaccountability3.htm (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
226. Discipline-State Court Judges, supra note 225.




type of organization, the risk that potential donors or participants will feel pres-
sure to contribute is high, and the appearance of a judge using the prestige of
office to procure donations is problematic. The codes should also require heigh-
tened disclosure requirements when judges attend fee-waived or reimbursed
seminars, even if they are law-related or legal programs."' They should require
not only that judges disclose attendance but also that program providers dis-
close detailed information regarding content and funding.2 29 Disclosure should
entail posting the information in a searchable format on the court's website in
order to make it easily accessible, understandable, and reviewable by the pub-
lic.23o This step is of particular importance for jurisdictions that continue to use
elections as a part of judicial selection or retention. Elections can be effective
accountability mechanisms only if the electorate is provided with transparent
and meaningful information regarding judicial conduct.
Receipt of invitations from both law-related and non-law-related nonprofit
organizations should be subject to the same provisions that govern attendance
at fee-waived seminars. More specifically, the determination of whether accep-
tance is permissible should be made by the individual judge, considering such
factors as the source of funding, the mission of the sponsoring organization, the
purpose of the event, and the appearance that will be created by attendance.
Where a judge decides to accept an invitation from a law-related or other non-
profit group, the judge should be required to disclose acceptance, and the spon-
soring group should be required to disclose detailed information regarding the
amount and nature of the invitation's value and the schedule and purpose of
the event.
Regarding the latter category, receipt of gifts and social hospitality, code
provisions should be revised to treat lawyers and law-related organizations
more strictly than non-lawyers and non-law-related organizations. Currently,
228. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY (6th ed. 20o6) (describing transparency as a cornerstone of accountable
government); AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISA-
GREEMENT (1996) (discussing the value of transparency and openness in delibera-
tive democracy).
229. This would align with federal requirements. See Judicial Conference Policy on
Judges' Attendance at Privately Funded Educational Programs, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/SeminarDisclosure/judbrappc9o6c
.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). The ABA declined to adopt similar provisions on
the sole and inadequate ground that they "would be ... difficult to implement
throughout all the state jurisdictions." 2007 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION, supra
note 86, at 53.
230. This is all that is required under the three versions of the Model Code. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.15 (2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4H(1)-(2) (1990); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6C (1972). The 2007
version provides for the information to be posted on the court's website "when
technically feasible," but does not define or explain when it is and is not "techni-
cally feasible." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.15 (2007).
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the ABA's model codes and most state-enacted codes permit judges to accept
gifts and things of value from all lawyers, including lawyers appearing before
them, if the gifts are reported.2 31 In recognition of the problematic appearances
that can arise as a result of these provisions, the codes should be revised to pro-
hibit a judge from accepting gifts or things of value from any lawyer or law firm
unless the lawyer or firm is on the judge's recusal list." New provisions should
also prohibit a judge from accepting invitations to functions or events from
individual lawyers or law firms-again, unless they are already on the judge's
recusal list.
CONCLUSION
The judicial conduct regulation reform movement, though of salutary pur-
pose, exemplified ongoing efforts by the organized bar to regulate its regulator,
favoring itself in the process. The bar promoted an inverted vision of the rela-
tionship between the profession and the judiciary-one in which judiciaries and
judges fell under the purview of the profession-such that the already close
relationships between the profession and the judiciary grew even closer. Inte-
gration of the profession and the judiciary can mean increased political efficacy,
but in this case, it has come at too high of a cost to the profession and state
judiciaries, as well as to core values of political liberalism. I have proposed that
the public's interests may be best served by reorienting bench-bar relationships
toward a model of collaborative governance, in which a strong, independent
legal profession engages with strong, independent state judiciaries.
The contours of the judicial conduct regulation reform movement and the
resulting codes of conduct mark only the beginning. Much work remains to be
done to evaluate the precise nature and closeness of relationships between the
legal profession and state judiciaries-including important comparative work
that could lead to innovative solutions. In the meantime, it is incumbent upon
the ABA, state professional groups, and state judiciaries to begin to restore
independence to the profession and to judiciaries-and, in doing so, to restore
public trust and to ensure that the profession and judiciaries are able to protect
the values of political liberalism. We cannot know what shape future threats to
our democratic values will take or when they will arise. But we can help ensure
that judiciaries and the profession alike are independent and powerful enough
to serve and protect each other, and in turn to serve and protect the democratic
values upon which our legal system rests.
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232. But see Geyh, supra note 68, at 41-43 (discussing the problems with relying on dis-
qualification as a means of addressing appearances of impropriety and bias).
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